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THE IMPACT OF MANAGED CARE PAYER
CONTRACTS ON THE SUBSPECIALTY
MEDICAL PROVIDER: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
THAT IMPACT ON THE CARE OF
DISABLED CHILDREN
Stephanie Rijkinson-Mann, M.D.*
INTRODUCTION
While it is evident that the remodeling of America's health care
industry1 into a third-party payer system 2 continues to evolve in
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their unconditional love, patience and support.
1. The "health care industry" is the business enterprise concerned with supplying
services and equipment for the maintenance or restoration of health. WEBSTER'S
COLLEGE DICrIONARY 599, 666 (2d ed. 1997).
2. The health care industry has been transformed into a "managed care model"
with "managed care plans" that focus on managing health care so that costs of provid-
ing medical services can be decreased. In this type of health care delivery system, a
third party (a party other than the physician or the patient) determines the type, na-
ture and extent of medical care that will be paid for so as to decrease costs. Charac-
teristics of such systems include arrangements with selected "providers" (physicians,
dentists, etc.), who are chosen by the managed care plan to "participate" because they
provide a less expensive "package deal" for medical services offered to patients en-
rolled in the plan (the "enrollees"). There are arrangements by which the providers
share in the risk incurred in providing health care to select groups of enrollees, e.g., by
agreeing to a set fee in advance for caring for a certain number of enrollees, and then
providing whatever health care needs arise subsequently at no additional cost to the
plan. The plans often include financial or program coverage incentives or penalties to
enrollees who do not use selected providers. The plans institute so-called "quality
assurance" measures to insure that health care is delivered in a cost-efficient fashion
and conduct "utilization review" measures, by which providers are monitored to see if
they, in fact, practice efficiently or appropriately within the rubric of "medically nec-
essary" care. Physicians are placed under tight contractual control with provisions
that may violate public policy. Reimbursements made for physician services are de-
creased by the plan, which issues fee schedules (a list of fees charged for each medical
procedure or service performed) with previously agreed upon fees that usually are
below what the physician ordinarily would charge, but which the physician accepts in
exchange for an increased number of patients. Managed care plans can refuse to pay
for the medically unnecessary use of hospital facilities and other ancillary services,
and they can decrease reimbursements allowed for diagnostic testing procedures as
well. Managed care organizations, therefore, are engaged in practices that have a
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dramatic fashion, it is unclear just how the government and private
industry plan to finance effective 3 health care delivery systems to
high-risk communities, and in particular, to poor,4 developmentally
disabled5 children with surgical problems.6 Uniform application of
preventive health measures to health care in general ignores the
needs of populations requiring acute care for health problems that
cannot be predicted or prevented.7 Surgeons (for example, pediat-
ric neurosurgeons) deliver highly specialized services to propor-
tionately small populations with major disabilities, making these
practitioners less attractive to managed care organizations.'
direct impact on the practice of medicine. For the neurosurgeon, these cost-cutting
measures are being implemented at a time when the costs of neurosurgical treatments
have not been fully evaluated. See John A. Kusske, Managed Care - the Growth of
Cost Containment and the Impact on Neurosurgical Practice, in NEUROSURGERY IN
TRANSITION: THE SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGERY
3, 3 (James R. Bean ed., 1998) [hereinafter Kusske, Managed Care]; see also Richard
A. Roski, Changing Reimbursement for Neurosurgery, in NEUROSURGERY IN TRANSI-
TION: THE SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGERY 61, 66
(James R. Bean ed., 1998). See generally Peter R. Kongstevedt, THE ESSENTIALS OF
MANAGED CARE HEALTH (1995).
3. "Effective" health-care delivery systems actually accomplish the intended re-
sult of providing health care to designated populations. See WEBSTER'S COLLEGE
DICrIONARY 416 (2d ed. 1997).
4. "Poor" refers to those families and their dependents who fall under the federal
poverty level. However, the states determine family eligibility for financial aid. Until
1996, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program assured fed-
eral funds to match state funds for certain categories of low-income people: the aged,
blind, totally disabled, and dependent children. The state determines eligibility re-
quirements and payment guidelines. This program was subsequently repealed by the
Welfare Personal Responsibility and Reform Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-93, Stat
2105 (1996). Welfare status now is used to determine eligibility. RAND E. ROSEN-
BLA-Vr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 412 (1997).
5. A "developmentally disabled" child is one who has a physical incapacity
caused by a physical defect or infirmity, or a bodily imperfection, or who has mental
weakness affecting his physical or mental development. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
461-62 (6th ed. 1991).
6. Surgical problems include structural or anatomical abnormalities children may
be born with, brain and spinal cord tumors, or trauma.
7. Preventative health care measures cannot eliminate acute surgical conditions
such as appendicitis (inflammation of the appendix) or traumatic injuries, nor predict
surgical conditions requiring emergency care with which a child may be born, such as
brain tumors, hydrocephalus (excessive accumulation of fluid causing pressure inside
the brain), intracerebral hemorrhage or spina bifida (a defect in the spinal column
through which the spinal cord protrudes).
8. The development of managed care affects those providers caring for the poor
by excluding them from health care networks because it is assumed that the care they
provide is expensive, and that they attract sick, uninsured patients. See Sara Rosen-
baum, Beyond the Freedom to Choose: Medicaid, Managed Care and the Family Plan-
ning Freedom of Choice Requirement, 163 W. J. MED., SuPP; Sept. 1995, at 33; Note,
The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751, 754
(1997) [hereinafter Medicaid Managed Care].
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A critical challenge facing managed health care programs today
is the creation of subsidized, workable health delivery programs for
disenfranchised 9 and medically fragile groups, especially poor, de-
velopmentally disabled children. The private sector, thus far, is not
committed to assuring competent, accessible health care to the un-
insured1" or lower income patient, the ethnic minority populations,
and other ill communities who often require significant medical at-
tention.1 ' There is no evidence to date that health maintenance
organizations ("HMOs")12 even have considered financing effec-
tive health care delivery systems to high-risk communities.
9. "Disenfranchised" here refers to being deprived of a right or a privilege. See
WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 375 (2d ed. 1997) . However, the term "disen-
franchised," as applied to health care consumers was utilized by Trubek and Hoffman
in their article on health care reform as synonymous with "marginalized," "subordi-
nated" and "disadvantaged." See Louis G. Trubek & Elizabeth A. Hoffman, Search-
ing for a Balance in Universal Health Care Reform: Protection for the Disenfranchised
Consumer, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1994).
10. In 1992, 17.4% of the non-elderly population (38.5 million people) had no
health insurance and did not receive publicly financed health assistance. Only 52% of
the non-elderly with incomes below the poverty line, as defined within 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(a)(10)(A)(i), were covered by a public plan, 50% by Medicaid. Most of the
uninsured were working adults (56.7%). The rest were children (25.4%) and non-
working adults (17.8%). See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 597-98. By 1996, there
were 41.5 million non-elderly Americans without health insurance. See Medicaid
Managed Care, supra note 8, at 731. The number of people in the United States
without health insurance increased by 15% over the last five years. See The Business
Council of New York State, Inc. INSIDE THE BUSINESS COUNCIL (May 1998) [herein-
after "BCNYS"]. In New York, from 1991 to 1996, the proportion of New Yorkers
without insurance rose 34 % so that health care providers are shouldering a greater
proportion of the financial burden inherent in caring for an uninsured population
incapable of caring for its health care. See BCNYS; The Public Policy Institute of New
York State, Inc., Managing with Care, § 2 (June 1998).
11. See Vernellia R. Randall, Does Clinton's Health Care Reform Proposal Ensure
(E)qual(ity) of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor?, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
167, 190 (1994).
12. In New York, a comprehensive system of authorization and regulation of
HMOs was developed to assure that health services of "good quality" be provided to
all citizens who choose to take advantage of that alternative to meet their health care
needs. "Good quality" was not defined. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH L. § 4400 (McKinney
1999). The "health maintenance organization" encompasses any person, natural or
corporate, or any group of such persons who enter into an arrangement, agreement or
plan or any combination of arrangements or plan which proposed to provide or offer,
or which do provide or offer, a comprehensive health services plan, in which compre-
hensive health services are provided to each member of an enrolled population in
consideration for a basic or periodic charge. See id. § 4401(1)-(2). "Comprehensive
health services" means all those health services that an enrolled population might
require in order to be maintained in good health, and includes physician services, in-
patient and out-patient hospital services, diagnostic laboratory and therapeutic and
diagnostic radiology services, and emergency and preventive health services. See id.
§ 4401(3). In essence, an HMO is a licensed state entity, licensed by the Department
of Justice and the Department of Health, which provides medical care through a sys-
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This Note explores the impact of current managed care contrac-
tual practices on the subspecialty 13 provider's ability to deliver
health care to chronically ill and disabled children. Part I sets forth
the historical events giving rise to the development of health care
reform. Part II details the evolution of health contracts and the
resulting changes in reimbursements for subspecialty medical ser-
vices. Various physician agreements with several managed care or-
ganizations ("MCOs")' 4 in the New York metropolitan area will be
reviewed to see how contract conditions 5 affect compensation 16
for pediatric neurosurgical services.
Part III details the impact of managed care on the management
of the chronic health problems experienced by children with neuro-
logical disabilities. Because chronically disabled children are often
medically indigent,' 7 they are forced to resort to Medicaid 8 in or-
tem of prepaid physician-providers. Medical care is controlled through a primary-
care gatekeeper physician who determines what care is necessary, and participants are
required to seek treatment only from approved physicians. Though many HMOs are
federally qualified, this qualification is not required for operation under state law. See
Health Maintenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000).
13. "Specialization" refers to a physician's "confining [his] attention to a single
disease, region of the body, age, or sex of a patient for study, research, and treat-
ment." STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 1308 (Williams & Wilkins 24th ed. 1982)
[hereinafter STEDMAN'S].
14. A "managed care organization" (MCO) is defined as a reimbursement frame-
work along with a health care delivery system that is combined into a single entity
responsible for integrating and coordinating the financing and delivery of services.
These services traditionally were divided between physicians and patient-payers. TWo
examples of MCOs are HMO and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"). PPOs
consist of groups of providers who agree to provide care to patient populations for
discounted fee-for-service rates. Patients who choose to go "out of plan" to non-
preferred providers pay higher cost-sharing, and are therefore steered to preferred
providers. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 799 (1997) [hereinafter FURROW, HEALTH LAW].
15. Calamari and Perillo have defined a contract as "a condition [that] is an act or
event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless the condition is excused, must occur
before a duty to perform a promise in the agreement arises (condition precedent), or
which discharges a duty of performance that has already arisen (condition subse-
quent). See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 438 (3d ed.
1987).
16. "Compensation" is the term used by managed care plans to refer to reim-
bursement or payment for services rendered.
17. "Medically indigent" is used here to refer to one who is in need of medical
treatment and needs financial assistance to pay for it. The medically indigent are
those whose incomes are slightly above welfare levels-thereby making them ineligi-
ble for welfare-but are unable to afford high medical bills.
18. Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid created a statutory enti-
tlement to healthcare-through cooperative state and federal programs-for low in-
come people who are aged, blind, or disabled, or who are eligible for AFDC
assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 3.4(b). Medicaid must cover "categorically needy" per-
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der to access health care. The conditions imposed by managed
care contracts on the pediatric neurosurgical health care provider
will be compared to current Medicaid agreements. Reimburse-
ments by different health care plans for the same neurosurgical
procedure will be reviewed. The effect of these fee schedules on
costs incurred in delivering pediatric neurosurgical care to this par-
ticular population will be explored. The data will be analyzed in an
effort to evaluate what long-term health care policy considerations
may arise affecting the care of chronically disabled children with
special medical care needs.
Part IV proposes alternative solutions for affordable health care
delivery systems for poor, medically fragile groups with complex
health problems. This Note concludes that, notwithstanding the ef-
forts of the health care industry to reorganize health care into af-
fordable delivery systems, the industry has not succeeded in
integrating the medically disenfranchised consumer into the health
care system.
I. GENESIS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM
A. Goals of Managed Health Care
While the first exercise in prepaid group practice dates back to
1910, when the Western Clinic in Tacoma, Washington was devel-
oped,19 managed care, as it is known today, evolved as a response
to skyrocketing health care costs.20 As early as 1972, when na-
sons, including AFDC recipients; children, pregnant and postpartum women with in-
comes below certain federal poverty guideline standards; aged, blind or disabled
individuals receiving federal Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI"); and Medi-
care beneficiaries whose income is less than certain federal poverty guideline stan-
dards. SSA § 1902(a)(10)(A); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1-435.170, 436.1-436.128. States also
have the option of covering "medically needy" people under Medicaid with federal
financial participation ("FFP"). Medically needy persons are those who, but for
slightly higher incomes, would otherwise qualify as "categorically needy." SSA
§ (a)(10)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 435.300. Hospitals and physicians participating in the Medi-
caid program cannot refuse needed treatment to Medicaid patients, must accept
Medicaid payments as payment in full for covered services rendered to Medicaid re-
cipients, and cannot seek additional payments from individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
19. See Kusske, Managed Care, supra note 2, at 6.
20. National expenditures on health care increased from $12.7 billion in 1950 to
$41.9 billion in 1965 to $647 billion in 1990. Since much of the growth in absolute
expenditures reflects inflation, the increases in the cost of medical care should be
compared to consumer prices or should be measured as a proportion of the gross
national product (GNP). Between 1980 and 1988, the medical care component of the
consumer price index increased 85% compared to a general increase in inflation of
43%. The proportion of the GNP devoted to medical care has risen from 4.4% in
1950 to 12% in 1990. In 1967, the federal government spent $12 billion on health
care, and state and local governments spent $7 billion. In 1990, the federal govern-
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tional health expenditures were ninety-four million dollars, annual
health care costs already were said to have reached "crisis" propor-
tions.2 ' Yet, during the following decade, health care costs rose
12.2%, and costs now amount to more than $1 trillion spent per
year on health care. 2
Under traditional indemnity plans, patients had no incentive to
choose economically efficient2 3 providers or procedures, nor did
physicians try to control the number of services rendered.2 4 Ad-
vances in health care technology and the development of new med-
ical and surgical procedures encouraged patient demand for the
"latest" in health care, a desire not discouraged by the health care
profession. Not only did physician consultations increase in fre-
quency and volume, but physician fees escalated as well. 25 Man-
aged care developed as a response to these spiraling health care
ment spent $196 billion, and state and local governments spent $73 billion. See
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND Fi-
NANCE 325 (1991)[hereinafter FURROW, FINANCE]. In New York alone, hospital ser-
vices, physician services and prescription drug costs tripled between 1980 and 1993.
Hospital costs rose $24 billion a year. All three increases were greater than the over-
all inflation rate during that same 13-year period, which was reported to be about
75% or almost 5.8% per year. See BCNYS, supra note 10, at § 2.
21. The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid coincided with a dramatic escalation
in national health care spending. See Kenneth W. Wing, American Health Policy in
the 1980s, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608, 620 (1986).
22. BCNYS, supra note 10, at § 1.
23. An "economically efficient" provider might consider the financial cost of the
health care provided in making a medical decision. However, if a doctor complies
with his non-delegable fiduciary duty to his patients, he must act with the patients'
interests in mind. Providing incentives to the physician to disregard this duty may
constitute criminal bribery under state and federal law. Costs may not be of any con-
sequence to the patient primarily because a third party (such as the employer) is foot-
ing his health care bill. The patient may expect all medical care that is of any
conceivable benefit to him, or may not understand the financial impact of her treat-
ment decisions. From an ethical point of view, if costs are not of consequence to the
patient, then they should not factor into the doctor's treatment decisions. This con-
flict between medical ethical obligations to patients, and patients' desire to receive the
"best" care possible without cost considerations by either party, presents the need for
some kind of overseer. This role has been left to employers and insurers, both private
and government. See MARK A. HALL & IRA MARK ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 8-13 (1990).
24. Cost-based payment systems, based on "customary, usual and reasonable"
charges, suggested that the more government and private insurers would pay the hos-
pital or provider, the higher the costs for health care services because of guaranteed
reimbursements. This trend resulted in overutilization of expensive technology and
new equipment, highly trained support staff, in-hospital care and surgical procedures,
and prestigious physicians, with no controls on volume of services billed. See E.H.
Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719
(1987).
25. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 18.
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costs by emphasizing preventive health care in an effort to avert
costly health problems.26 MCOs offered financial incentives and
management controls to deter patients from consulting physicians
unnecessarily27 and to prevent health care providers from abusing
the system.28 It was a direct response to overutilization of health
care services by implementing quality assurance controls,2 9 utiliza-
tion management,3 0 and concurrent3l and prospective32 review of
health care provisions and expenditures.
26. Examples of preventive health care with respect to newborns include pre-natal
care, emphasis on proper nutrition, and avoiding illicit drug use and smoking during
pregnancy. Correction of elevated blood pressure by the use of medications may pre-
vent life-threatening heart attacks or strokes.
27. Minor ailments such as ear infections could be diagnosed and treated during
regularly scheduled medical appointments, rather than requiring an additional exami-
nation out-of-hours or a visit to the emergency room.
28. Cost containment methods implemented by the MCO decrease unnecessary
and costly procedures or treatments that a physician might recommend in several
ways. A "gate-keeper" physician could review a provider's recommendations and de-
termine whether the care was medically necessary before authorizing the procedure
for payment and allocating funds for it. Another party within the HMO system could
review the procedure, either at the time it was implemented or afterwards, to deter-
mine whether it should be paid for. Reimbursement fees for the actual procedures
could be determined by the MCO itself without any provider participation. See Daniel
R. Sullivan & Perry Oxley, Managed Care Organizations, in THE PHYSICIAN'S PER.
SPECTIVE ON MEDICAL LAW 355 (Howard H. Kaufman & Jeff L. Lewin, eds. 1997).
29. "The ultimate goal [of quality assurance] is the assurance of complete, contin-
uous, family-centered medical care of high quality to persons who are unable to pay
for it themselves." HEW Supplement D § D-5140. In Corcoran v. United Health-
Care, Inc., the court noted that the health care plan's "Quality Care Program" (its
quality assurance program) promised the plan's subscribers that professionally-quali-
fied reviewers, "together with your doctor ... work to assure you and your covered
family members receive the most appropriate medical care." 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992).
30. Insurance companies, MCOs and other health benefit plans hire or contract
services from physicians, nurses or special companies to perform "utilization review,"
an assessment of the "medical necessity" of services for which claims are made. There
is, however, no consensus as to the meaning of the term "medical necessity." It has
been variably defined as "efficacious and safe" by the HMO in Dallis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ga. 1983 ), aff'd, 768 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1985). The
plaintiff argued that the term applied to "necessary for the treatment" of a diagnosis.
Other courts have interpreted the term to mean "appropriate," or "consistent with
community medical standards," as in Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr.
850 (Ct. App. 1989). In Siegal v. Health Care Serv. Corp., the court determined that
"medical necessity" is an issue of fact to be decided by the jury because of the ambi-
guity of the term. 401 N.E.2d 1037 (I11. App. Ct. 1980). However, whatever the term
"medical necessity" means, it is a medical judgment and should be subject to the ap-
propriate standards. See MANAGED CARE HANDBOOK FOR NEUROLOGICAL SUR-
GEONS 97 (John A. Kusske et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Kusske, HANDBOOK].
31. As the service is provided, managed care organization nurses examine patient
records. "Concurrent review" is the analysis of treatment costs at the time the treat-
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The MCO is distinguished from earlier health care systems by its
maintaining tight control over its health care delivery system. 33 To-
day's MCOs are based upon a series of contracts among indepen-
dent entities offered by insurers or other companies merging
medical care with health insurance,34 selling health care from the
plan's providers to enrollees who purchase this combined product
for a pre-negotiated fee.
Cost containment stems from the member's obligation to receive
his health care from a restricted list of designated network provid-
ers as a condition of coverage. To keep patient-enrollees' fees low,
the MCO negotiates lower compensation rates with the physicians
who participate in the plan. These participating providers function
as independent contractors under written contractual or employ-
ment agreements, and their selection and authority to furnish cov-
ered benefits is controlled by the managed care company.
Financial inducements are offered to employers via lower-cost
health care "premiums, "36 encouraging them to participate in these
plans.
ment is being administered so as to determine whether or not those costs will be
covered by the health care plan, as opposed to pre-certification and pre-authorization.
32. "Prospective review" analyzes potential costs of prospective treatment, so as
to determine whether a health care plan will "cover" or pay for them.
33. Patient incentives are inducements for enrollees to use health care providers
participating in the plan. Provider reimbursement incentives are enticements for par-
ticipating providers to be cost efficient in their use of health care services. Utilization
management is a series of procedural reviews used to contain the number and type of
services rendered so as to contain costs. Quality assurance programs ensure the care
provided is considered "appropriate" in order to reduce cost and volume of the ser-
vice rendered, even though incentives already are placed on both the provider and the
patient to be cost-effective. Primary care physicians act as "gatekeepers," regulating
the utilization of specialty services, ancillary services including outpatient mental
health, home health care and pharmacy, and hospital services. See Sullivan, supra
note 28, at 355.
34. Traditionally, the medical community opposed mergers between medical care
providers (physicians) and third-party payer insurance plans because of the perceived
threat to physician autonomy and control over medical practice and income. This
opposition culminated in Group Health Ass'n of Wash, D.C. AMA v. United States, in
which the AMA was indicted on charges of violating the Sherman Act in trying to
prevent the operation of a pre-paid group health plan. 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Subsequently, prepaid health care plans served as the conceptual payment basis for
the HMO in the federal 1973 HMO Act (based upon President Nixon's initiatives on
behalf of HMOs). These initiatives, in turn, developed into today's managed care
scenario, in which the original issues of physician autonomy and income have re-
turned to the forefront. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 547-48.
35. Id. at 552.
36. An example of such an incentive is CSEA plan's coverage for mental health
and substance abuse, which has no deductible and no annual or lifetime benefit maxi-
mum, on the condition that participants receive treatment from a network provider.
1950
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MCOs offer financial incentives to health care providers whose
practice styles are less costly.37 Physicians who comply with the
plan's cost-cutting goals by accepting decreased reimbursements
for their services constitute this restricted group of providers. The
financial incentive for the physician to accept lower compensation
rates from the MCO stems from one of two circumstances. The
physician might make a profit because of the increased volume of
patients that are referred to him because he is a preferred provider.
Alternatively, the physician might opt to participate in a given
health care plan because many of his patients become enrolled in
that plan, and he might otherwise lose a significant portion of his
practice. 8
Strict physician credentialing requirements include an analysis of
physician practice patterns in an effort to identify those physicians
who use health services more efficiently. 39 There are variably de-
If the participant uses an out-of-network provider, the participant has an annual de-
ductible of $500 for outpatient care and $2000 for inpatient treatment, as well as limits
on what the plan will pay for over the participant's lifetime. For mental health treat-
ment, medically necessary care is unlimited when provided within the plan. A 30-day
limit applies each year if participants use an out-of-network provider. See BCNYS,
supra note 10, at Section 2.
37. A common component of some MCO agreements is the "withhold," whereby
the health care plan retains a portion of the provider's reimbursement presumably as
a reserve to cover unexpected expenses. If utilization of services does not exceed
projections, and if plan costs are within the MCO's budget, some or all of the with-
hold is returned to the physician. It is possible that the withhold may be construed as
a "bribe," and therefore subject to criminal penalties. A slightly different version of
this withhold is the "variant-risk withhold" system in which a physician who does an
above-average job of managing health care utilization receives the full withhold in
addition to a bonus payment. Both systems encourage the provider to implement
fewer services, thereby fostering underutilization, also referred to "reverse" fraud and
abuse. More money remains in the pool of funds withheld initially, thereby assuring
the efficient provider a larger withhold at the end of the term. Kusske, HANDBOOK,
supra note 30, at 103.
38. Joseph A. Snoe, Selected Managed Care Provider Issues, in AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 456, 456 (1998). It is unclear whether the implicit
threat to physicians of completely losing their medical practices if they do not partici-
pate in health care agreements forces them into adhesion contracts with the managed
care company. Such contracts are standardized and offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis without the ability to bargain. BLACK'S, supra note 5, at 40; see also Medicaid
Managed Care, supra note 8, at 754; John F. Little, Note, Managed Care Contracts of
Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient
Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397 (1997).
39. "Physician profiling" is a network selection process, which examines physi-
cians' billing and claims records in an effort to determine the physician's utilization of
health services. Generally, it does not take into account the characteristics of the
population for which the physician provides services. If the population is one with a
poorer health status requiring more health services, the physician's profile suffers in
comparison to that of other physicians caring for healthier patients who consume
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fined quality assurance criteria used by primary care "gatekeep-
ers"40 who screen and limit the use of specialized, costlier
treatments.41 However, uniformly applied cost containment pro-
grams based upon preventive health measures ignore the needs of
those patients with acute, unpredictable problems.
B. The Goal of Medicaid
While Medicaid ostensibly was created to provide medically indi-
gent patients equal access to health care, it has not succeeded yet in
fulfilling its original promise to bring them into the mainstream4 2 of
medicine.43 The original goal of the program was to afford the
poor a floor of basic medical services. The poor were to be inte-
grated into middle-class patterns of health care. This was to be
accomplished by providing eligible patients with health insurance
fewer health services. As such, plans may bypass the physician caring for the sicker
patient in favor of enlisting onto its provider roster the physician caring for healthier
populations. ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 560.
40. A "gatekeeper" is a medical professional assigned responsibility for managing
health care within an MCO on a prospective and concurrent basis. The gatekeeper is
responsible for approving referrals and services prior to delivery, if full benefits are to
be paid. Gatekeepers for neurosurgical services are typically primary care physicians,
such as pediatricians, internists or family practitioners. Kusske, HANDBOOK, supra
note 30, at 210.
41. For example, U.S. Healthcare requires that the primary provider approve di-
agnostic procedures, such as MRI scans, requested by a specialist evaluating a patient.
Theoretically, if the primary provider does not approve the procedure, the scan will
not be paid for by the health plan. See Healthcare Provider Manual, U.S. Healthcare-
Aetna.
42. The dominant movement in health care today is toward third-party payer sys-
tems that pay for health care. This pattern characterizes the trend, if not the norm, in
health care today. The original vision of Medicaid was that it would provide "main-
stream" care for its recipients. However, what may be termed "mainstream"
medicine may be a de minimus program as opposed to an optimal one. FURROW,
HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 877.
43. There are several examples of discrepancies and problems within the Medicaid
program that affect its coverage system. Because federal law does not require provid-
ers to participate in Medicaid programs, many poor patients cannot find providers
willing to treat them and accept Medicaid payment. Patricia A. Butler, Legal
Problems in Medicaid, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS
215, 222 (Ruth Roemer & George McKray, eds., 1980). Physicians and dentists who
treat Medicaid patients must enter into participating provider agreements with state
Medicaid agencies. These agreements prohibit providers from charging beneficiaries
whatever amount they choose. ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 222, 526. Medicaid
covered medical services for 35.1 million people in 1994, excluding 42% of those liv-
ing in poverty. Medicaid coverage varies among the states-eligibility requirements,
funding levels and benefits differ. See Medicaid Managed Care, supra note 8, at 753.
In some states, especially in the South, Medicaid covers only minimum services,
whereas New York and California provide almost comprehensive coverage. See But-
ler, supra, at 221.
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that would enable them to purchase health care services in the pri-
vate sector.44
Medicaid is supposed to cover and pay for multiple but basic
services, many of these at discounted prices, for the categorically
needy.4 5 Included are in-hospital costs;4 6 out-patient services; 47
physician services; rural clinic services; radiology and laboratory
testing; skilled nursing facilities 48 for patients over twenty-one
years of age; home health care services 49 for patients eligible to be
in nursing homes; family planning services; and screening for chil-
dren's health defects. °
However, Medicaid finances health care services rather than
providing health care per se, and depends upon voluntary provider
participation. There are no controls over the composition of Medi-
caid provider networks.51 Medicaid's emphasis on reimbursement
44. Medicaid's goal was to eliminate the stratification of two-tier health care
(which resulted in inferior care for the poor) and to integrate the poor into middle-
class patterns of hospital and medical care, considered to be superior. Prior to the
enactment of Medicaid in 1965, health care services for the poor were subject to state
discretion, including budgets allocated for whatever kind of care was considered ap-
propriate for low-income patients. A hierarchical health care system developed, strat-
ified on the basis of economic class, race and ethnicity, still evident (even after
Medicaid's enactment). Poor patients were admitted to wards and cared for primarily
by doctors-in-training (interns and residents), occasionally with senior physician (at-
tending) supervision. These "clinic" patients received inferior care provided by less
experienced health care providers compared to middle-income and upper-income pa-
tients, who had private or semi-private rooms and care administered by fully-trained
physicians, rather than doctors-in-training. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 415.
45. See supra text accompanying note 18.
46. In-patient services include those medical treatments or diagnostic tests per-
formed while a patient is in the hospital, such as blood work, radiology, nursing, medi-
cations, ventilators, intensive care, food, laundry and housekeeping services. It
excludes doctors' fees.
47. Such services may include blood work, radiological procedures, nursing and
medical treatments administered in a dispensary or a clinic. It usually includes doc-
tors' fees.
48. A "skilled nursing facility" is a private institution, other than a hospital, or a
distinct part of an institution (such as a convalescent wing), licensed by the State,
which provides personal care, sheltered care or skilled nursing and related services or
rehabilitation services. Generally the care is similar to that provided in a hospital, but
with lower staffing ratios and less intensive care than that provided in an acute care
hospital. See DOUGLAS A. HASTINGS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 3
(1995).
49. "Home health care services" are intermittent skilled nursing services or physi-
cal, speech or occupational therapy provided by a licensed public agency or private
organization for a patient confined to his home. FURROW, FINANCE, supra note 20, at
75; SSA § 1814(a)(2)(C).
50. See Butler, supra note 44, at 215.
51. There are no uniform state controls over the composition of provider net-
works, though the Office of the Inspector General has been designated to oversee
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for even costly and arguably inappropriate institutional services 52
may have contributed to its limited funding and its failure to bring
conventional and uniform medical coverage to poor populations. 3
State Medicaid funds allocated to the care of the disabled are
growing more rapidly than any other segment of the Medicaid
budget.5 4 Average annual health care costs for this group are six
Medicaid physician panels. The government enforces compliance by these providers
with federal fraud and abuse laws through the Fraud and Abuse Control Program.
Among those regulations which make up the backbone of recent enforcement activity
are: (1) the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000), which makes it illegal to
submit a false claim for payment to the government or to a payer who receives federal
funds; (2) the Criminal False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000), which makes it a
felony for anyone to present a false claim to any U.S. civil, military or naval officer;
(3) the Federal Medicare/Medicaid False Claims and Anti-Kickback Statute, 42
U.S.C. 99 1320a-7b (2000), which makes it a felony to make false statements in con-
nection with a claim for payment under the Medicare or Medicaid programs and pro-
hibits offering, receiving or soliciting illegal remuneration; (4) the Federal (Stark)
Physician Self-Referral Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000), which prohibits a physician
from making a referral to an entity for the furnishing of designated health services, for
which payment otherwise may be made under Medicare/Medicaid, where the physi-
cian has an immediate family member or financial relationship with the entity; (5) the
Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (2000), whereby several acts of false claims constituting a pattern may
give rise to a civil or criminal RICO action; (6) the Federal False Statements Statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000), which prohibits anyone from knowingly falsifying material
facts, statements or documents; as well as (7) the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000), which prohibits the use of the mails or wires to advance a
scheme of fraud. New York State Fraud and Abuse Regulation covers (1) New York
State's Anti-Kickback Law, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH L. § 238(a-c) (McKinney 1999), which
makes it illegal to make a referral for medically related services to another provider,
where that provider is an immediate family member or has a financial relationship
with the referring provider; (2) New York State's Clinical Laboratory Law, N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH L. §§ 585-588 (McKinney 1999), which makes it illegal for any clinical lab to
receive any kickback in exchange for referrals for clinical lab services; and (3) the
Unacceptable Practices under the Medical Assistance Program, N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 18 , § 515.2 (1999), which describes kickbacks, improper record keep-
ing, unnecessary services and other practices, which, if committed under the Medicaid
program would constitute an administrative violation. Ari J. Markenson, Compliance
Programs in the Health Care Industry, 3(3) HEALTH L. J. (NYSBA) 3, 4-5 (1998).
52. The U.S. Senate Committee on Finance had conducted hearings during which
witnesses testified that a significant proportion of the health services provided under
Medicare and Medicaid were probably not medically necessary. The Supreme Court
stated that, in addition to the economic impact of this situation, the committee was
concerned about the effects of overutilization on health care, observing that
"[u]nnecessary hospitalization and unnecessary surgery are not consistent with proper
health care." Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
53. See Butler, supra note 44, at 215.
54. In 1990, the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Supplemental Security In-
come Program (SSI) coverage for children in Sullivan v. Zebley 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
This program increased Medicaid coverage for disabled children, since SSI recipients
generally are eligible for Medicaid. It should be noted that, in 1972, the federal SSI
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times greater than health care costs for poor, non-disabled chil-
dren, and three times greater than health care costs for poor, non-
disabled adults.55 Yet, there are no risk-adjusting methods to ac-
count for the higher utilization of health services by this disabled
population, making it financially difficult for traditional providers
who have served Medicaid beneficiaries in the past to continue do-
ing so. 56  Provider reimbursements for necessary subspecialty
care57 are low in comparison to managed care payments,58 and do
not cover the subspecialists' costs for providing health care to this
program replaced preexisting state Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD),
the primary welfare program for adults. Prior to that time, states tied Medicaid eligi-
bility to AABD financial eligibility levels. Once SSI replaced AABD, Medicaid re-
cipients became eligible for SSI. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 865 n.3.
Furthermore, while dependent children and their families make up over three-
quarters of Medicaid recipients, they are only responsible for about a third of Medi-
caid expenses. However, Medicaid covers programs for the disabled, including se-
verely disabled children of middle-class families. Although the disabled make up
about 14% of Medicaid recipients, they consume some 73% of Medicaid expendi-
tures. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 864-67.
55. See Furrow, Health Law, supra note 14, at 864-67.
56. Issues that affect the enrollment of disabled populations in managed health
care plans include the MCOs lack of experience with this type of patient; the lack of
controls over provider networks; and most importantly, the absence of methods for
"risk adjusting" premium payments to health plans to account for the increased use of
services by the disabled. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 596.
57. An example of "necessary subspecialty care" is surgery for a brain tumor. A
child who comes to an emergency room with a brain tumor (the second most common
cancer in children, following leukemia, a malignant proliferation of abnormal white
blood cells) and increased pressure in the head requires urgent or emergency surgery
to remove it, a life-saving procedure. STEDMAN'S, supra note 13, at 775; see also
WALDO E. NELSON, ET. AL., NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 1777 (11th ed. 1979).
Another common diagnosis among neurologically impaired children is cerebral palsy,
a defect of motor power, coordination and, often, mental retardation, due to brain
damage secondary to a loss of oxygen. See STEDMAN'S, supra note 13, at 1019. This
condition is often associated with hydrocephalus (accumulation of cerebrospinal fluid
inside the brain due to an obstruction in the normal pathways by which this fluid is
recycled and reabsorbed, causing life-threatening increased intracranial pressure if
not corrected immediately), for which a shunt is needed. The shunt (which acts to
bypass the block and siphon off the fluid into a different area in the body, where the
excess can be absorbed or eliminated), upon which the child is dependent to control
the pressure in his head, can malfunction precipitously, requiring emergency surgery.
See Carolyn M. Carey et. al., Hydrocephalus: Etiology, Pathologic Effects, Diagnosis
and Natural History, in William R. Cheek et al., PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY: SUR-
GERY OF THE DEVELOPING NERVOUS SYSTEM 185, 189 (3rd ed. 1994).
58. An example of this disparity in reimbursements is Medicaid's payment for sur-
gery for brain tumor. Medicaid pays between $500 and $600 for this surgery, no mat-
ter how complicated or long the procedure may be. Private insurance pays anywhere
from $4,000 to $11,000 for exactly the same procedure, depending upon the health
care plan. See Tables 1 and 2.
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population. 9 It is difficult to reconcile these specific issues with
Medicaid's commitment to free access to providers.60 Medicaid ex-
pects physicians to provide poorly compensated 61 health care to
Medicaid recipients despite the financial constraints imposed upon
the physician by the poor reimbursement rates.62 Notwithstanding
Medicaid's original promise to finance some minimum level of
59. The largest component in the subspecialist's costs in providing health care is
malpractice insurance coverage. In New York, annual malpractice fees calculated for
"Premium Class 1," i.e., full-time neurosurgery and pediatric neurosurgery, range
from $114,804 to $129,694 for occurrence policies (covering claims arising from pro-
fessional services rendered during the policy period regardless of when the claim is
reported) to $120,543 to $136,185 for claims-made rates after the eighth practice year
(covering claims arising from one's professional services rendered while the policy is
in effect that are first reported while the policy is in effect or during an extended
reporting endorsement period). These rates apply to New York City, and the Hudson
Valley area, including Westchester, Orange, Rockland and Sullivan counties. Profes-
sional Liability Insurance Premium Rate Schedules for Physicians and Surgeons,
Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, effective July 1, 1998. Current Medi-
caid reimbursement fees in New York hardly cover this expense. See supra text ac-
companying note 59.
60. The court reviewed the "equal access requirement" for health care for Medi-
caid recipients in Clark v. Kizer, stating that "equal access" means that health care is
available to recipients at least to the extent that those services are available to the
general population. It noted that the State failed in its statutory duty to ensure equal
access to dental care because reimbursement rates were so low that the State could
not enlist enough providers to make care available under the plan to the extent that it
was required to. 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal. 1990). See also Roski supra note 2, at 63;
Sullivan, supra note 28, at 359; Sandra A. Price, Health Insurance, Medicare and
Medicaid, in THE PHYSICIAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON MEDICAL LAW 373 (Howard H.
Kaufman & Jeff L. Lewin, eds., 1997).
61. Most states use fee schedules that are well below the fees paid by Medicare or
private insurance, making physician participation in Medicaid historically low. States
have sought to limit payments to physicians for services provided to older disabled
patients who are covered by both Medicare and Medicaid. States argue that these
patients are Medicaid recipients, so that their physicians are entitled to payment at
the lower Medicaid rates. Medicare pays physicians 80% of the federally determined
Medicare fee, and the state pays the 20% deductible. Many states refuse to pay the
20% deductible if 80% of the Medicare fee is more than 100% of the Medicaid fee.
Because Medicaid fees are so low, 80% of Medicare is almost always more than 100%
of Medicaid, so physicians are denied the fee to which they would be entitled under
Medicare. If physician participation in Medicaid is low because of poor reimburse-
ment rates, this low reimbursement violates federal Medicaid regulations requiring
that "payments must be sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under
the plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services are availa-
ble to the general population." See 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (1994).
62. Participation in Medicaid per se is voluntary. However, physicians who treat
Medicaid patients must accept the state's reimbursement fee, which has been re-
ported to range as low as 21% of charges in some states. See ROSENBLAT-r, supra
note 4, at 526. For pediatric neurosurgical (for necessary surgical subspecialty proce-
dures), the reimbursement rate ranges from five to 15%. See supra note 61. Addi-
tionally, network providers who have contracted to serve individuals enrolled in
health care plans also must furnish care to the Medicaid recipients enrolled in that
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health care for poor and disabled populations, the program has
failed to secure affordable access to the subspecialty care many of
the disabled need primarily because it does not adequately pay for
the costly treatments that some patients require.63 This discour-
ages subspecialists from providing anything more than emergency
health care to Medicaid patients.
H. CONTRACTING AND REIMBURSEMENT
A. Changes in Health Care Contracting
Because participation in managed care provider networks is not
automatic, physicians must apply to be included in health care
plans as preferred or "participating providers. ' 64 The incentive to
participate often stems from a lack of choice,65 because physician
income has decreased in recent years, largely due to managed
health care.66 Non-participating physicians whose patients become
enrolled in managed care plans stand to lose a significant portion
of their practice. 67 Managed care organizations have the sophisti-
cation and incentive to bargain with providers for low prices 68 since
the physician theoretically will accept decreased compensation
rates in exchange for an increased patient base.69
The physician's medical judgment may be directed by HMO pay-
ment decisions, especially payer denials for care. Utilization re-
view practices curtailing services that physicians judge to be
appropriate for patients may force providers into medical decisions
plan, even though they are reimbursed at Medicaid rates. See Woolfolk v. Duncan,
872 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
63. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 522.
64. PHYSICIANS HEALTH SERVICES OF NEW YORK, INC. PHYSICIAN AGREEMENT,
Art. I, Definitions § 1.12 (1997).
65. HMOs require their enrollees to consult only their in-plan providers. The
HMO can negotiate discounts from individual providers theoretically by guaranteeing
them an exclusive right to a certain volume of patients. In exchange for these exclu-
sive contracts, providers may be willing to offer significant discounts below traditional
fee-for-service reimbursements. However, the implicit threat is that, if the provider
does not offer a discount, the plan will shift its enrollees to another provider. See
Medicaid Managed Care, supra note 8, at 754; see also Little, supra note 39, at 1422.
66. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 517.
67. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., the Court recognized the district court's
finding that "because of the large number of subscribers, doctors are under 'heavy
economic pressure' to take them as patients and to agree to Blue Shield's system for
charging the cost of their care." 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1029 (1985) (quoting Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 734 (D.C. Mass. 1984).
See Little, supra note 39, at 1427.
68. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 735.
69. See Snoe, supra note 39, at 456.
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they would not otherwise make.7" This outcome can have a detri-
mental impact on reimbursement to the physician for services pro-
vided. The MCO can enforce its cost-containment decisions under
the guise of "quality assurance" by penalizing a provider or termi-
nating a provider's participation with the plan without explaining
why.71 HMOs may discriminate 72 against doctors because of their
costlier treatment practices73 by simply not credentialing them,74 or
70. In Varol v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., the plaintiff argued that utili-
zation review practices and associated financial incentives would adversely affect the
provider's clinical judgment. 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In Wilson v. Blue
Cross of S. Cal., a patient was discharged from a psychiatric hospital because his in-
surance company would not pay for the hospitalization. Shortly thereafter, the pa-
tient committed suicide. The court held that summary judgment in favor of the
insurance company could not be granted since there was a triable issue as to whether
the conduct of the patient's insurance company and doctor was a substantial factor in
causing the patient's death. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. App. 1990). In Wickline v. Cali-
fornia, the court held that a physician is still liable even if he complies with an MCO
decision to deny care that he believes is medically necessary. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819
(Cal. App. 1986) petition for review dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987). The court
stated that "[T]he physician who compli[ed] without protest with the limitations im-
posed by a third party payer, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot
avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health
care payer as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative
medical decisions go sour." The physician has a non-delegable fiduciary duty to do
what is in his patient's best interest.
71. Managed care plans can oversee health care costs by determining contract
terms that control the relationship between the health care plan and the providers.
The provision giving either party the right to terminate the agreement without cause
can be implemented by the MCO should the provider not comply with its cost con-
tainment measures. Since physicians have been terminated in the past for insisting
upon MCO authorization of medically necessary treatment, the threat of termination
can discourage them from advocating on behalf of patients. See ROSENBLATr, supra
note 4, at 513, 517; see also Little, supra note 39, at 1446, 1456.
72. In this scenario, the transformation to managed care (regulated by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, the Health Care Finance Administration, etc.)
might cause cost-conscious HMOs to disfavor the work of doctors in poor communi-
ties, exposing them to different types of discrimination, including racial and economic.
Lack of available services in the community may force the poor patient to seek health
care at larger medical centers, where it is costlier. See Note, The Impact of Managed
Care on Doctors who Serve Poor and Minority Patients, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1625, 1626
(1995) [hereinafter Impact of Managed Care].
73. A physician caring for neurologically impaired children who cannot communi-
cate may need to order frequent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain in
order to see if there are any anatomical changes that correlate with a change in the
child's clinical status. This radiological study produces detailed images of the body
regardless of intervening bone by means of a strong magnetic field and low-energy
radio waves. More specifically, if a neurologically impaired child with a congenital
abnormality of the brain becomes lethargic or unusually irritable, or develops epilep-
tic seizures, an MRI is usually ordered to rule out any condition requiring emergency
surgical intervention. Sometimes several sequential studies are needed within short
periods of time if the anatomical changes are small and difficult to perceive visually.
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by "deselecting" them75 from their provider plans. Those physi-
cians with consistent patterns of overutilization of ancillary ser-
vices, low patient volume, or no observable commitment 76 to
managed care objectives may be least likely to find their contracts
renewed.77
In addition to physicians' apprehensions of sudden termination
by the MCO, there are other concerns. Major contract issues for
most physicians, and for neurosurgeons in particular, include: pro-
fessional liability transactions; 78 indemnity clauses;79 scope of ser-
In the New York metropolitan area, fees for one MRI may range between $800 and
$1,000. See Personal Communication, MRI Diagnostics of Westchester, Valhalla,
New York.
74. In Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., the HMO re-enrolled the surgeon-plain-
tiff as a primary care physician, rather than credentialing him as a surgeon. In this
case, the "termination without cause" provision of the physician's contract was imple-
mented in order to terminate his employment without having to explain why, even
though the termination was not related to quality reasons. In turn, the physician also
could leave the plan without giving any reason. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996). Provider
membership decisions are unilateral decisions made by the MCO. Due process is not
always required, though the standards used theoretically have a rational relationship
to the MCO's business. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985).
75. If providers do not meet the plan's standards (e.g., if their practice styles are
costly or they do not meet "quality" standards), they may be screened out of the
provider network. See Kusske, HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 26; see also Impact of
Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1629.
76. The MCO may claim that a physician's use of health services is excessive with-
out determining whether patient costs were medically justified, and claim that the
physician's style of medical practice is too costly and not in keeping with the cost-
containment methods of the particular MCO.
77. See C. S. Rowe, The Impact of Managed Care on Specialty Practices, 41 MED.
GROUP MGMT Ass'N 36 (1994).
78. The issue arises when a managed care organization supervises and influences
either directly or indirectly a health care provider's decisions in the interest of cost-
containment, but the provider is still held liable. In Wickline v. California, the state
Medicaid agency (Medi-Cal) applied prospective cost constraints to inpatient hospital
care and major surgery. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Cal. App. 1986) In this case, a
patient suffered medical complications arising from her early hospital discharge
before full recovery after surgery. The physician had discharged her when the insur-
ance plan refused to pay for her continued hospitalization. While the court held that
"[t]hird party payers of health care services can be held legally accountable when
medically inappropriate decisions result from . . . implementation of cost contain-
ment," it also decided that the treating physician remains legally responsible for qual-
ity of care.
79. Contract language by which the physician is required to indemnify the health
care plan may subject him to litigation risks for actions of other physicians or actions
and policies of the plan that directly affect how the physician is allowed to manage the
patient's care. Since malpractice does not protect the physician who indemnifies, he
may be assuming an uninsured risk. See Kusske, HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 97.
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vices covered;80 term renewal and termination of contracts;81 gag
rules;82 and mode of compensation for services provided. The pay-
ment structure of the contract is the most important provision for
both the provider and the managed health care plan. Most com-
monly, managed care contracts involve modified fee-for-service 83
arrangements for specialists or capitation fees8 4 for primary care
80. Unless specifically stated in the agreement, the physician assumes that he is
obligated to perform all services relevant to his specialty, though investigatory proto-
cols and unusually complex, subspecialized procedures are excluded. One significant
issue that arises in this context is whether the physician, in delivering the usual ser-
vices, runs the risk of bankrupting his practice. See id. at 94.
81. While termination with or without cause theoretically is the right of either
party, some health plans include termination clauses that are not equally fair to both
parties. For example, Westchester Prepaid Health Services Plan (Healthsource) Par-
ticipating Specialty Physician Agreement § 7 Term and Termination stipulates that
"This Agreement may be terminated a) by WPHSP at any time with or without cause
upon thirty (30) days written notice; and b) by Physician at any time with or without
cause upon ninety (90) days advance written notice." This provision allows the plan
to dispense quickly with a physician, disrupting his cash flow abruptly, as opposed to
the plan's far longer (90-day) allowance which may allow the provider to adjust to the
economic change. However, the physician still has obligations post termination for
continuity of care of panel member patients until transition of their care to another
provider.
82. Some contractual arrangements do not allow physicians to discuss treatment
options that are not covered by the particular managed care plan with their patients.
Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors: Critics Charge That Some HMO's Require Physicians
To Withhold Vital Information From Their Patients, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996. In 1995, U.S.
Healthcare's "gag clause" providing that "Physician shall agree not to take any action
or make any communication which undermines the confidence of enrollees. . ." was
exposed. See ROSENBLA-rr, supra note 4, at 565, 645. In 1996, federal and individual
state legislation was proposed, outlawing the use of gag clauses. The measure, which
would have prohibited any managed care organization from restricting any communi-
cation between physician and patient with respect to the patient's physical or mental
condition or treatment options, was defeated. See id.
83. In fee-for-service systems, the provider is reimbursed for each service pro-
vided. The specialist sends in a claim and the plan pays it. A variation is the dis-
counted fee-for-service, which can either be a straight discount on charges, or a
discount based on volume or a sliding scale. Other variations on fee-for-service in-
clude global, flat, or case rates. The flat rate is a single fee paid for a procedure
regardless of how much or how little time and effort the surgeon spends doing the
procedure. A global fee is a flat rate encompassing more than a single type of service.
For example, pre- and postoperative care as well as follow-up office visits are included
in the surgical reimbursement fee. Case rates are single reimbursements that combine
both institutional and professional charges into one lump sum. This last system is not
often implemented in neurosurgery. Most commonly used is the relative value scale,
such as the resource-based relative value scale ("RBRVS"), or a fee allowance sched-
ule. In the relative value scale, each procedure is assigned a relative value, which is
multiplied by a conversion factor so as to arrive at a payment value. In a fee allow-
ance schedule, the fees are explicitly defined in the contract. See Kusske, Managed
Care, supra note 2, at 23.
84. Capitation is a method by which the risk of providing health care is distributed
away from payers to providers. Capitation refers to a fixed payment that an MCO
1960
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physicians.8 5 Most specialists are involved in modified fee-for-ser-
vice contracts.8 6
Managed care plans often select those physicians who care for
generally healthy87 populations unlikely to require costly medical
attention. With managed care emphasis on improved disease man-
agement, MCOs encourage primary care fields that emphasize pre-
vention of health problems, such as pediatrics, internal medicine
and family practice. 88 Doctors are considered cost-effective if they
perform fewer procedures,8 9 hospitalize fewer HMO subscriber pa-
tients, order fewer diagnostic tests, write drug prescriptions in an
effort to avoid hospitalization, and minimize referrals to more
costly specialists. This strategy effectively eliminates surgeons
from this group, especially those who care for children with compli-
cated surgical problems requiring multiple procedures and sub-
specialty care.'
pays a physician to cover a specified set of services, regardless of the actual number of
services provided to each patient. If patient costs exceed the capitation amount, the
physician must absorb these additional costs. If costs are below the capitation, the
physician may keep the additional money. There are two types of risk involved. In
the "upside risk," the provider is paid an additional amount if he realizes savings from
practicing in an efficient manner. By comparison, in the "downside risk," a portion of
the provider's fee is withheld and is returned to the provider only if costs are kept
below a stated target. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 563; see also HASTINGS,
supra note 49, at 269.
85. Primary care physicians are internists, family practitioners and pediatricians.
See Kusske, HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 210.
86. See Linda 0. Prager, Fee-for-service Plans Tops Among Doctors in Most Mar-
kets, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, at 15.
87. When an employer buys coverage from an MCO that contracts to furnish
health care for a pre-set fee (i.e., on a financial risk basis), the MCO insures the
employees and provides medical care for that pre-set fee. If the employee does not
need health care services because he is healthy, then the MCO makes money since it
expends relatively little on that employee's health care. On the other hand, if an
employee is sick and requires a lot of health care services, the MCO must provide
those services for the same pre-set fee, thereby losing money if the employee's care
amounts to more than the pre-set fee. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 553.
88. See Polly Miller, Doctors' Incomes: Who's Up, Who's Down, MED. ECON., Oct.
1998, at 45.
89. MCOs cut costs by avoiding unnecessary medical treatments or duplicative
services, with the least costly provider rendering services. See Snoe, supra note 39, at
457. Alternatively, MCO contracts may require primary care physicians to perform
specialty procedures (such as setting fractures, excising large skin lesions and suturing
wounds) since they receive the same reimbursement rate regardless of what proce-
dures they perform, in comparison to the specialist, who is paid by each procedure he
performs. See Little, supra note 39, at 1412.
90. Surgeons often must hospitalize their patients for operations that are consid-
ered "major," such as procedures requiring long hours of work, having risks of blood
loss or other medical complications, or involving major internal organs such as brain
and spinal cord, abdominal viscera, lungs, heart and some orthopedic surgeries for
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Managed care plans continue to make increasing demands upon
the health care professional to improve health care delivery by pro-
viding care more efficiently and cheaply. Specialists are asked to
assume a portion of the economic responsibility of caring for cer-
tain populations91 by furnishing services on a discounted fee-for-
service basis, like network doctors, or in a capitated agreement
with an MCO, an arrangement they may not be able to afford. 92
Health care organizations may decide to implement decreased re-
imbursement rates for particular procedures, possibly to discour-
age their implementation by medical providers unwilling to
undertake liability risks93 without further compensation. Health
care plans cannot limit enrollees on the basis of particular charac-
teristics such as the present status of their health, anticipated need
bone abnormalities. Such surgeries require, at the very least, anesthesia, critical care
nursing, prolonged hospitalizations with multiple medications and ancillary proce-
dures, such as radiology, all of which are costly services.
91. Physicians assume the risk of financial loss due to provision of inefficient
health care services because the HMO reimburses them most commonly on a capita-
tion basis, rather than fee-for-service. See Medicaid Managed Care, supra note 8, at
754. Managed care contracts can demand that providers partly subsidize their Medi-
caid benefits plans. Amendment to the Agreement between Independent Health As-
sociation, Inc. (Hudson Valley), paragraph (d) states, "Member Physician authorizes
IHA to withhold from any fees payable to the Member Physician such amounts as are
deemed necessary by IHA to allow Member Physician to share the risk of costs and
utilization in the Medicaid Health Benefit Plan. Member Physician acknowledges that
withheld fees will be deposited in a risk pool which is separate and distinct from
IHA's other businesses and that the determination of whether some or all of the with-
hold will be returned is exclusively at the discretion of the IHA Board of Directors."
Id.
92. Costs for the emergency care of one patient can mount to the entire amount
received for caring for a patient group on a capitated basis. See Howard Kim, Medi-
Cal Tells Physicians to Shape Up, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 24/31, 1998, at 5.
93. A physician may be unwilling to continue performing sophisticated procedures
that are considered high-risk, especially for liability (malpractice) purposes. Further-
more, if it seems unlikely that an HMO can be liable for a malpractice action, a physi-
cian may be concerned that he will be held liable for the consequences of medical
decisions shaped by cost-effective concerns of the HMO. The consequences for the
physician can be significant. If a physician loses a malpractice case, the payment
made on his behalf as part of the settlement is reported and permanently documented
in the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), established by the Health and
Human Services Department under the umbrella of the Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act ("HCQIA") of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (1999). The Data
Bank is a registry for information about medical malpractice or professional miscon-
duct by health care practitioners. Licensure boards have access to the Data Bank.
The information also may be used by hospitals in evaluating applicants to, or mem-
bers of, its medical staff. Though the general public does not have access to this infor-
mation, there have been several proposals to allow increased access, most recently in
Massachusetts. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 86.
1962
2000] MANAGED CARE AND DISABLED CHILDREN 1963
for health care or age.94 However, with state approval, health care
plans may limit their patient enrollment because of their presumed
inability to deliver services or to maintain financial stability.95
B. Practice Cost Analysis and the Impact of Managed
Care Contracts
This Note reviews representative physician agreements96 to see
how contract conditions97 affected compensation for specialized
physician services. The ability of the physician to modify reim-
bursement amounts or contract requirements was analyzed. In all
eight contracts reviewed, the managed care plan retained complete
control over reimbursement rates, payment adjustments and deter-
mination of the medical necessity of all services provided prior to
forwarding payment to the enrolled provider. The relevant word-
ing in these clauses was similar from one contract to the next.
The specialist physician's compensation for services is to be
made in accordance with the current HMO "reasonable" fee
94. See H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. § 1402(1) (1993).
95. Plans may decrease or eliminate benefits to such a degree that enrollees may
have to seek coverage elsewhere. In Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Pro-
gram for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109
(1985), the court held that ERISA created tax incentives to encourage voluntary em-
ployer action regarding retirement plans, and that "courts have no authority to decide
which benefits employers must confer upon their employees; these are decisions
which are more appropriately influenced by forces in the market place and, when
appropriate, by federal legislation." Id. at 456. See also H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong.
§ 1402(a) (1993).
96. The eight contracts chosen for review are representative of those agreements
offered to specialist physicians (pediatric neurosurgeons) in the New York metropoli-
tan area. These included agreements with Aetna-U.S. Healthcare; Anthem Blue
Cross and Blue Shield ("Anthem BC&BS"); Cigna; Westchester Prepaid Health Ser-
vices Plan ("WPHSP"); Independent Health Association, Inc.; Oxford Health Plans
(NY), Inc.; Physician Health Services of New York, Inc. ("PHS"); and Welicare of
New York, Inc. See U.S. Healthcare Specialist Physician Agreement; Anthem Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Connecticut Participating Provider Agreement; Westchester
Prepaid Health Services Plan ("Healthsource"), Participating Specialty Physician
Agreement; (1996) Independent Health Association Inc., Participating Physician
Agreement; Oxford Health Plans (NY), Inc. Consultant Physician Agreement;
(March 31, 1998) Physicians Health Services of New York, Inc. Physician Agreement;
(Apr. 15, 1997) Wellcare of New York, Inc. Agreement Between Wellcare of New
York, Inc., and Consulting Specialist.
97. Contract analysis was limited to four factors. First, the ability of the physician
to modify reimbursement amounts or contract requirements was analyzed. Next, re-
quirements for provision of services were reviewed. Third, the physicians' financial
responsibility for providing malpractice coverage was noted. Finally, fee schedules
offered by the different managed care plans were compared to each other and to
Medicaid's current New York rates.
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schedule.98 The HMO can unilaterally adjust rates as it sees fit 99 or
can include in a single reimbursement for the primary procedure
all of those services that it determines are part of that primary pro-
cedure.'a° The HMO can decide at any time whether it will con-
sider a service "medically necessary," as well as determine the
criteria necessary for reimbursement to the provider of this service.
The HMO maintains the final authority to do either.101
Next, requirements for provision of services were reviewed. All
of the contracts reviewed stipulated that the physician provider was
obligated to care for any member enrolled in the plan. The health
care provider must accept whatever reimbursement rate the HMO
designates as appropriate, 102 including care for Medicaid recipients
enrolled in the HMO, whose care is paid for at Medicaid rates and
not according to the HMO fee schedule.0 3
Third, the physician's financial responsibility in providing his
own malpractice coverage was noted. No HMO or managed care
plan offered any financial assistance to the physician toward obli-
gatory malpractice insurance. 0 4 All plans reviewed required that
the physician purchase his own policy, stating specifically that the
physician must obtain and maintain malpractice insurance at his
own expense.10 5  Furthermore, the contracts stipulated that the
physician is solely liable for any treatment decisions he makes 0 6
98. U.S. Healthcare Specialist Physician Agreement § 2 Compensation (A) speci-
fies this type of provider reimbursement, though no definition of "reasonable" or "eq-
uitable" is provided. See U.S. Healthcare, supra note 97, at § 2. See Westchester
Prepaid Health Services Plan (Healthsource) Participating Specialty Physician Agree-
ment § 2(a) where compensation is almost identical.
99. See Oxford Health Plans (NY), Inc. Consultant Physician Agreement §§ 2-3
Reimbursement Rates; Payment/Hold Harmless. July 9, 1998.
100. See Healthsource, supra note 97, at § 2 Compensation (B).
101. See Wellcare of New York, Inc. Agreement with Consulting Physician § I(A)
Services. See also Healthsource, supra note 99, at § 1 Services (B).
102. MCOs have threatened to terminate physicians for not accepting lower reim-
bursement rates. See Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., 114 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
If a physician has signed a contract accepting the fees and conditions that the MCO
stipulates, then the physician is obligated to accept whatever fee the MCO pays him.
He has contracted to provide health care, which he is obligated to do, no matter what
the reimbursement may be. See Little, supra note 39, at 1460.
103. See U.S. Healthcare, supra note 97, at § 6 Other Program Participation.
104. Since the physician is viewed by the HMO as an independent contractor, it is
the physician's obligation to obtain malpractice insurance.
105. See e.g., Oxford Health Plans (NY), Inc., Consultant Physician Agreement § 8
Insurance (Mar. 31, 1998). "Consultant Physician shall provide and maintain... (mal-
practice) insurance ... subject to the approval of Oxford, and shall not be less than
$1,000,000 per claim and $3,000,000 per year." Id.
106. See U.S. Healthcare, supra note 99, at § 5 Insurance. "Specialist Physician at
his or her sole cost and expense shall procure and maintain such policies of general
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independent of whether the decisions are made in accordance with
MCO requirements or guidelines, so that the MCO itself cannot be
held liable.10 7 In effect, the physician is paying for malpractice in-
surance coverage for the HMO as well as for himself. These
clauses were similarly worded in all the contracts reviewed.
Finally, fee schedules offered by different managed care plans
were compared to each other and to Medicaid's current New York
rates.10 8 Fee schedules from five health care plans in the New York
metropolitan area were compared to each other according to their
CPT codes. 10 9 Among the five plans, most of the reimbursement
rates were comparable. 10 However, in comparing the New York
Medicaid reimbursement rates to the MCO reimbursement rates
for the same CPT codes, the Medicaid fees were calculated to be,
at best, only twelve to fourteen percent of the "reasonable" reim-
bursement rates allowed by the managed care companies."'
and professional liability and other insurance as shall be necessary to insure it and its
employees against any claim or claims for damages arising by reason of personal inju-
ries or death occasioned directly or indirectly in connection with the performance of
services hereunder in connection with this Agreement." Id.
107. In Howard v. Sasson, Civil Action No. 95-0068, 1995 WL 581960 (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 3, 1995), a primary care physician (acting as "gatekeeper" for the MCO) refused
to authorize an infant's emergency room visit on the basis of a telephone conversation
with the mother wherein she described the child's symptoms. The child died shortly
after arriving in the emergency room. The court remanded the negligence claim to
state court, holding that ERISA preemption of claims against health care providers
does not exist without allegations that the organization refused to pay for, or author-
ize, treatment. In Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), authorization
of a patient's transfer to another hospital for specialty care was refused by a physician
acting as a utilization reviewer for the HMO. The court noted that the negligence
claim was based upon a delay in medical care occasioned by a cost containment proto-
col set by a for-profit organization.
108. See BCNYS, Managing With Care, supra note 10, at § 2 (stating that New
York's Medicaid program is the most generous in the nation by far). The disparity
between the average reimbursement rates for managed care plans, considered "rea-
sonable," and the inexplicably low rates that Medicaid pays, is significant. Whereas
private insurance plans pay between $4,000 and $11,000 for brain tumor surgery,
Medicaid pays between $500 and $600 for the exact same procedure. Table 2.
109. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIANS' CURRENT PROCEDURAL
TERMINOLOGY (1997) [hereinafter "CPT"].
110. See infra Table 2.
111. Generally, the so-called "high quality"care, such as that provided in the pri-
vate health care system, is too expensive for Medicaid to subsidize. Medicaid fees
range from 30% to 75% of private market prices, the upper range of more generous
reimbursements going to less expensive primary care services such as pediatrics and
family practice. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 418. Rates of reimbursement vary
from state to state and between specialties. The most costly care is the least reim-
bursed, such as neurosurgery. The reimbursements for neurosurgery hardly cover the
subspecialist's expenses in maintaining a medical practice. If he cares for an increas-
ing number of Medicaid patients, his overall income will decrease because of the de-
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Federal Medicaid law suggests that payment rates should be
"consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and...
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic area. 112
With such low reimbursement fees, it is unclear how the Medicaid
program can expect providers to offer medical services voluntarily,
because many private practitioners will not be able to keep their
practices solvent if obligated to do so under these circumstances. 113
Though the Supreme Court upheld the right of providers to sue
states over the adequacy of Medicaid payments, 1 4 it is unclear if a
provider denied payment actually could recover damages against
the state. 115 Generally, providers still accept Medicaid payments as
payment in full for their services" 6 despite low reimbursements be-
cause of their non-delegable duty to care for patients in general. 17
The manner in which Medicaid pretends to enlist "enough provid-
ers" to accomplish its stated goal is unclear under the circum-
creased compensation he receives. If he cannot pay his overhead, malpractice, etc.,
then he cannot maintain his medical practice.
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(30) (2000); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.200, 447.204 (2000).
113. In Clark v. Kizer, the court recognized that the State had failed in its statutory
duty to endure equal access to dental care. Denti-Cal (California Medicaid coverage
of dental care) reimbursements were so low as to be insufficient to attract and enlist
enough providers to secure dental care for the poor to the same extent as that availa-
ble to the general public. 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal. 1990). After that case, Califor-
nia was required to increase rates from 55% to 80% of dentists' customary charges.
See Clark v. Coye, No. 92-16852, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26615, at *2 (9th Cir. Octo-
ber 5, 1993) (finding no abuse of discretion by magistrate in imposing the increased
rate).
114. In Temple Univ. v. White, 941 F.2d 201 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1032 (1992), state Medicaid rates were found to be inadequate under federal stan-
dards. Pennsylvania Medicaid hospital rates were held to be inadequate to meet the
costs incurred by efficiently aud economically operated hospitals, by failing to take
into account that the hospitals served a disproportionate number of low-income pa-
tients with special needs. See also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990);
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 860 F. Supp. 1309
(N.D. Ind. 1994); Arkansas Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993).
115. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
116. After the passage of the Boren Amendment, requiring states to pay facilities
rates that are "reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in
conformity with applicable State and Federal laws regulations" (SSA § 1902(a)(13)),
there were numerous cases litigated by providers challenging the adequacy of Medi-
caid payment rates. Among these were AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1989); Folden v. Washington State Dep't of Soc.
and Health Serv., 981 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1992) However, providers have been less
successful in arguing these cases in recent years. See HASTINGS, supra note 49, at 237.
117. Under professional and ethical standards, a physician cannot withhold neces-
sary medical care from a patient. To do so would constitute malpractice. See ROSEN-
BLATT, supra note 4, at 560; see also Little, supra note 39, at 1448.
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stances because federal constraints somewhat limit state discretion
in setting physicians' fees.118
M. IMPACT ON DISABLED CHILDREN: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
If the objective of a health plan is to maximize the health of the
population it serves," 9 it is nothing less than institutionalized
(though not unlawful) discrimination to provide affordable health
care to some populations and not others. Yet this discrimination is
prevalent in today's managed care enviroment.
Though managed care organizations are highly lucrative players
in today's health care market and are traded on the stock ex-
change, there is evidence that they are now beginning to lose
money.120 Since the motives and interests of managed care corpo-
rations are driven by profit, there is little initiative outside of the
Medicaid or Medicare 12' systems to provide health care to poor
and ill communities. 22 These patients often require more expen-
sive medical treatments when their health status deteriorates be-
118. The Medicaid statute does not explicitly guarantee beneficiaries a "right" to
services, nor does it give providers a "right" to judicial review of state agency actions,
though "fair hearings" for applications denied assistance are required. While federal
Health and Human Services ("HHS") provisions can require that Medicaid pay quali-
fied providers, HHS has limited power to enforce this, since the ultimate sanction,
cutting off federal funds, is unavailable as a remedy. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4,
at 421-22.
119. David M. Eddy, Rationing Resources While Improving Quality: How to Get
More for Less, 272 JAMA 817, 823 (1994). Dr. Eddy supports a population-based
concept of quality for the health plan shared by the physician. He writes, "we [physi-
cians among others] will need to change from focusing on individuals to focusing on
populations . .. ."
120. While HMOs kept prices down to attract customers, two thirds of them now
are losing money and raising their premiums. Michael Meyer, Oh No, Here We Go
Again, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 46, 47. A look at the local stock listings shows
that in the past year, Oxford went from a high of 22-1/2 to a low of 5-13/16. Stock
listings, WALL ST. J. & N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998.
121. Congress enacted Medicare as part of the Social Security Amendments in
1965. SSA Title XVIII. The program established a national health insurance system
for aged Americans. Part A covers hospital services and is an entitlement program
(anyone meeting the eligibility criteria is entitled to the benefits). Part B is a volun-
tary program (monthly premiums must be paid) covering physician services. See Has-
tings, supra note 49, at 191-93.
122. In October 1998, at least three New York-based HMO's (Oxford, United
Healthcare and Vytra Health Care) announced that they would no longer serve se-
niors enrolled in their Medicare programs effective January 1, 1999. Oxford Health
Plans narrowed its fourth-quarter loss to $19 million from $285 million a year by quit-
ting several "unprofitable" Medicaid markets. 5 O'clock News (NBC television
broadcast, Dec. 8, 1998); see also Leah Rae, HMO's, Seniors Meet Today, JOURNAL
NEWS, Dec. 9, 1998, at lB.
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cause they are less likely to receive consistent preventive health
care.
Thus far, when the private health care industry wished to maxi-
mize its revenues, it could resort to whatever policy was necessary
to do so, even if restricting certain groups' access to health care was
the only way to accomplish this goal. The easiest target is, of
course, the most vulnerable population: the disenfranchised ill, in-
cluding disabled children, the aged and ethnic Americans. 123 While
managed care plans may exploit Medicaid enrollments when it is a
lucrative proposition, health plans leave the Medicaid system when
they no longer have the financial capacity to serve those disen-
franchised communities. 124 Given the poor health status of chroni-
cally disabled children and their need for costly services, it is likely
that for-profit health care plans will exclude this population.2 5
The proper management of the chronic health problems that a
disabled, neurologically impaired patient has often requires ongo-
ing care and monitoring by a subspecialist. The absence of such
care can exacerbate a particular condition and may precipitate sec-
ondary health complications. Pediatric neurosurgical diagnoses, in
particular, may appear to be completely "cured" after successful
surgery without the apparent need for further medical evalua-
tion. 2 6 However, most of the chronic medical conditions requiring
123. See Randall, supra note 11.
124. HMOs have no obligation to provide care for the uninsured under many
Medicaid reform plans. When HMOs pull out of Medicaid programs because a dis-
proportionate amount of the funding is directed toward the costly care of the dis-
abled, local hospitals will have less revenue to subsidize charity care. See Medicaid
Managed Care, supra note 8, at 763. See also Ethnic Americans, supra note 125, at
189-90.
125. Stephen J. Pearson, Health Care for Uninsured and Underinsured Children:
Letter to the editor, 145 AM. J. DISABLED CHILD 1985 (1991).
126. For example, a child born with spina bifida, a defect where the spinal cord is
exposed without any protective covering such as skin, muscle or bone, is at risk of
meningitis and death if the lesion is not surgically repaired immediately. After suc-
cessful surgery, the skin abnormality is no longer evident. However, the diagnosis
may be associated with severe neurologic impairment and abnormalities of the spinal
cord, as well as associated deficits such as paralysis of the extremities; loss of sensa-
tion below the level of the lesion; bladder and bowel abnormalities, including consti-
pation and the inability to void without medication and intermittent urinary
catheterizations; hydrocephalus, an abnormal accumulation of spinal fluid in the
brain, requiring surgery to prevent lethal increased intracranial pressure; other abnor-
malities of brain development associated with mental retardation, seizures and diffi-
culty breathing; scoliosis, clubfeet and hip dislocations; and genitourinary
abnormalities including malrotation of the kidneys, hydrocele, undescended testes
and hydronephrosis, among other problems. The syndrome places the child at con-
stant risk of infection, meningitis, progressive weakness and even death if symptoms
of neurologic deterioration are not recognized and corrected. As a significant number
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pediatric neurosurgical care are life-long issues, including, but not
limited to, spina bifida and other life-threatening diagnoses, such as
obstructive hydrocephalus, cerebral palsy,12 7 epilepsy 128 and recur-
rent brain and spinal cord tumors. These severe medical and surgi-
cal conditions often fluctuate over the years.129 Subtle clinical
signs, if not immediately attended to, often herald catastrophic out-
comes.' 30 Each disability varies with each patient and over time.
Such details are easily recognizable to the subspecialist who is
equipped to respond instantly and rectify the condition, suggesting
that patients with such conditions need continuing subspecialty
care13 ' even when their surgical conditions appear to be cured. Yet
under the current health care system, once a person is deemed
of these children grow, they develop secondary problems referable to their original
condition, such as a tethered spinal cord, a scarring of the neural elements, which
subsequently causes scoliosis, a curvature of the spine, and further weakness leading
possibly to complete paralysis and loss of all neurological function. This disastrous
consequence may present itself subtly as mild back pain, for which an untrained gen-
eral medical practitioner may simply prescribe analgesics, warm soaks or physical
therapy, relatively inexpensive medical management, when compared to potential
surgery. If ignored for too long, subtle pain may progress to the irreversible neurolog-
ical problems described above, all of which can be prevented if attended to in timely
fashion by an experienced practitioner. See Donald H. Reigel & Deborah Rotenstein,
Spina Bifida, in PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY: SURGERY OF THE DEVELOPING NER-
VOUS SYSTEM 51, 52-56 (William R. Cheek et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994).
127. For definitions of hydrocephalus and cerebral palsy, see Carey, supra note 58,
and accompanying text.
128. "Epilepsy" is a chronic disorder characterized by paroxysmal attacks of brain
dysfunction usually associated with alterations in levels of consciousness and seizure
activity or convulsions. There are multiple etiologies, among them brain tumors, head
injury, strokes, infections and meningitis, and congenital abnormalities of the brain.
See STEDMAN'S, supra note 13, at 472.
129. For example, a child with epilepsy may require different dosages of anticonvul-
sant medications, or different medications altogether, as his body grows, which re-
quires frequent neurological evaluations and blood tests, among other diagnostic
studies. Occasionally, such children may require surgery to remove portions of the
brain that cause the seizure activity when medications are no longer beneficial. Id.
130. For example, the child with obstructive hydrocephalus who is dependent upon
a shunt may exhibit symptoms of a potentially catastrophic malfunction of the appara-
tus, which may go unrecognized by the non-specialist in neurosurgery. Such symp-
toms may include clinical findings as subtle as mild personality changes or subtle
changes in school performance.
131. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4 th Circuit reconfirmed the importance of
continuity of care in Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc., 62 F.3d 634 (4th Cir.
1995). However, the long-term relationship that a physician develops with his patient
appears to be less important. In Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., the plaintiff
argued that terminating a pediatrician's contract because he would not accept the
lower reimbursement rates imposed by the health care plan would jeopardize the phy-
sician-patient relationship. While the court recognized the value of such a relation-
ship, it ruled in favor of Aetna. 114 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
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"medically recovered," the otherwise disabled person often be-
comes ineligible for medical and surgical benefits.132
HMOs are more likely to evaluate physicians based on the cost-
effectiveness of their decisions, rather than on how they addressed
the health status of their patients.1 33 For poor people, and espe-
cially for children, this practice can be disastrous. Neurologically
impaired and chronically disabled children demand more expen-
sive specialized services, an unattractive option for the cost-con-
scious managed care business. Even when families resort to
Medicaid, the benefits offered through this plan do not adequately
cover the costs of the subspecialized medical and surgical work13 4
that neurologically disabled children require. Physician reimburse-
ments are so low that the physician's costs to deliver care, espe-
cially appropriate liability coverage, the costliest item that
physicians are obligated to provide out of their own pockets, 35
cannot be met. Without liability protection, physicians are unable
and unwilling to undertake the risk of caring for such high-risk pa-
tients. At the same time, managed care's decreasing reimburse-
ments to the medical provider 36 make it difficult if not impossible,
132. Not only do the disabled require medical intervention for the disability itself,
but they often have other special care needs that must be met in order to live in their
own homes, rather than in a chronic care facility, including rehabilitation, personal
assistance, home care and other equipment. These services are not always well cov-
ered by managed health care programs. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 1088-89 & n.29.
However, both § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (2000), and
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-
12213 (2000), specifically prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities in
many areas, including patient access to health care.
133. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 1628-34 & nn16-19; see also Mark V. Pauly, The
Public Policy Implications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 37
(1992). Health care organizations evaluate patients by using practice profiles, which
present data about the physician's cost of services. This data, concerning a physician's
economic performance, is then utilized in the MCO's decision whether to contract
with the physician. These profiles generally do not account for variations in the
health of different doctors' patients.
134. See Carey, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
135. While malpractice costs generally account for one percent of health care ex-
penses, the costs are borne disproportionately by physicians in particular specialties
and geographic areas. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 725.
Neurosurgical malpractice costs, in particular, are among the highest in the country.
Physicians spend $9 billion annually on malpractice insurance. Neurosurgeons pay an
average of $44,000 for "claims made" coverage (ranging from $17,000 to $74,000 de-
pending upon location, with maximums reaching $150,000). See American Associa-
tion of Neurological Surgeons and Congress of Neurological Surgeons, 1992
Comprehensive Practice Survey (1993). For sample estimates of neurosurgical mal-
practice costs in the New York metropolitan area, see also supra note 60.
136. MCO reimbursements for pediatric neurosurgery now range approximately
40-50% of the surgical fees usually reimbursed just five or six years ago.
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for the physician to cross-subsidize the care of this needy, vulnera-
ble population. 137
Competition for affordable health care relegates high-risk pa-
tients, such as developmentally disabled children, into specific
groups identifiable by virtue of the high cost of care they require
that may be so exorbitant as to be unaffordable without financial
support. 138 Because of the chronic nature of pediatric neurosurgi-
137. In the past, hospitals were able to use revenues from full-paying patients to
subsidize the Medicare and Medicaid patients. Mark Schlesinger & Richard W.
Smithey, Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care, in UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
CARE REFORM 48, 66-68 (Theodore R. Marmor ed. 1994). Similarly, many private
physicians had, in the past, been able to cross-subsidize uncompensated or poorly-
compensated care for the uninsured or Medicaid patients by relying on reimburse-
ments from commercially insured patients to cover the costs incurred in maintaining a
medical practice. While MCO reimbursements for pediatric neurosurgery have de-
creased, malpractice costs have remained the same or increased. See supra notes 59-
60 & infra note 138.
138. For example, a chronically ill, severely impaired child with spina bifida usually
requires significant health care and medical support. Among the costly items may be
ventilators; special made-to-order wheelchairs to accommodate the child's body as it
grows; diapers for urinary or fecal incontinence; intermittent bladder catheterizations
with sterile equipment used each time for the child who cannot empty his bladder;
round-the-clock specialized nursing care; medications; physical therapy; multiple sur-
gical procedures by different surgical subspecialties such as neurosurgery, orthope-
dics, and urology to correct ongoing problems that develop as a result of the child's
primary diagnosis, in addition to regular medical follow-up by neurologists and pedia-
tricians. For a wheelchair-bound, ventilator-dependent patient, costs for non-physi-
cian services are exorbitant. Specialized nursing for 72 hours a week (eight hours a
day, Monday through Friday, and 16 hours a day on weekends) is estimated at about
$90,000 a year. Specialized nursing care 24 hours a day, seven days a week throughout
the year at $30/hour costs approximately $260,000 a year. Ventilator costs (including
machine, tracheotomy collar and catheters) are about $500/month or $6000 a year.
Special electric wheelchairs cost up to $10,000. Braces, splints or crutches can cost
$1500 a pair each time they are replaced as the child grows. Physical therapy (PT)
treatments are approximately $135/session. If a patient receives PT five days a week,
it costs about $35,000 a year. Barrier-free lifts to transport a paraplegic person up and
down stairs costs $9000 to install. It costs about $8500 above the cost of a van to
modify it for the transport of a disabled person. Diagnostic studies, including X-rays
($50/individual film), CT scans ($200/study) and MRI scans ($600/study) can add up,
depending upon how often they are needed. An estimate total of the yearly expenses
incurred in caring for such a disabled child, excluding pharmaceutical, laboratory,
medical or hospitalization costs, is well over $300,000/year. If a family makes less
than $18,000-$20,000/year, they may qualify for Medicaid coverage. If their income is
above this, the family may have to pay $8000-10,000/year for a comprehensive health
care plan to cover these costs, above and beyond a deductible for which they are
responsible. Families above the poverty or categorically needy range may qualify for
a Medicaid waiver program, whereby $10,000 a month is allotted by Social Services
for medically necessary treatments. If the child's care exceeds this amount, then the
child is no longer eligible for this program because his care may be less expensively
administered in an in-hospital setting. Otherwise, the family is responsible for these
added expenses. It should also be noted that, as medical treatments and technologies
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cal disabilities, requiring frequent, repeated and long-term medical
intervention, some insurance plans "cap" the medical coverage
they will provide for disabled children by imposing certain limits
that the health care plan itself determines despite the physician's
recommendations to the contrary. 139
Families are often forced to resort to Medicaid, 4 ' or go into
bankruptcy and lose their health care coverage altogether.' 4' In
fact, while the aged and disabled represent only twenty-five per-
cent of Medicaid recipients, they consume nearly seventy-five per-
cent of all Medicaid expenditures, generally accounting for about
seventy percent of state Medicaid budgets.142 However, just like
private insurance HMOs, Medicaid managed care programs also
try to minimize access to more expensive health care by limiting
benefits to enrollees or by adhering to the Medicaid schedule since
there is little benefit in providing services for which Medicaid will
not compensate. 43
Physicians excluded from managed care plans may be driven out
of the medical profession completely, 44 forcing their own patients
advance, such disabled children live much longer than they had in the past, many now
with full-life expectancies. See Personal communication, The Family Connection,
Westchester Medical Center, Valhalla, New York.
139. In Higdon v. Boning, the court determined that a 42-year-old cerebral palsy
patient was entitled to coverage by the local government for physical therapy, assis-
tance with activities of daily living, and medical treatment, under the General Public
Assistance Law 296 A.2d 569 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.1972). This decision holding
local governments statutorily responsible to pay for hospitalization and other services
was disapproved in Sharp v. Department of Human Servs., 453 A.2d 890, 893 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982). In Miller v. Whitburn, the court held that despite a child's
eligibility of Medicaid benefits, Medicaid is allowed to place a "cap" on the benefits it
covers and is not required to pay for if a procedure is deemed "experimental" rather
than "medically necessary," or if, in the State's discretion, the procedure was not cov-
ered in the Medicaid statute. 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993).
140. This gap in the private insurance market was partly addressed in 1965 by the
federal enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. See Family Connection, supra note 140.
141. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer Choice Plan for the
1990s, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989).
142. See Medicaid Managed Care, supra note 8, at 757.
143. Section 1115(a) of the Social Security Act allows states to redesign their Medi-
caid programs as managed care systems. This portion of the Act gives the Secretary
of Health authority to change federal Medicaid requirements including reducing ben-
eficiary rights if it "assist[s] in promoting the objectives of" Medicaid. In only two
cases has this section been challenged successfully. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at
595.
144. As greater numbers of patients enroll in MCOs, physicians may find increasing
numbers of patients leaving their care because they are not enrolled with the MCO as
a participating provider. If a particular MCO enrolls a substantial portion of a physi-
cian's patients, a physician could face economic ruin if he is not enrolled with the plan
or is terminated from that plan. Physicians must sign contracts with many MCOs
1972
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to seek care elsewhere, perhaps in inconvenient locations or at in-
convenient times,14 5 possibly from less experienced' 4 6 or less com-
mitted physicians. 4 7 Given this scenario, uninsured or Medicaid
patients increasingly are forced to seek care from institutional phy-
sicians associated with teaching hospitals, whose Medicaid funds
help finance medical education and surgical residency training. 48
In this situation, both Medicaid patients and the uninsured are
treated primarily by those still in medical training, with little
clinical experience .149 As such, the Medicaid patient provides the
education for the physician in training. This medical staff may be
only cursorily supervised by experienced, fully-trained staff physi-
cians and surgeons for whom investing more time in these patients
may not be worth the expense. 50 There is rarely any continuity of
because they do not know which MCO will enroll a large number of his patients. See
Little, supra note 39, at 1427-28.
145. The uninsured may be forced to seek health care through emergency room
services for ailments that could have been prevented or at least treated earlier at a
lower cost, and may be hospitalized for conditions that might otherwise have been
avoided. See ROSENBLATiT, supra note 4, at 39.
146. The major medical centers where most disabled children access their health
care have large emergency rooms often staffed with medical students, interns, and
residents, who provide the majority of the health care.
147. Patients may be forced to seek care from managed care plans employing phy-
sicians who are under pressure to minimize costs. Physicians who are not experienced
with the culture, language and experiences of a particular ethnic group may spend less
time with patients who are not fluent in English. See Impact of Managed Care, supra
note 73, at 1626; see also Randall, supra note 11, at 193-94.
148. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 534.
149. An "intern" has an M.D. (medical doctor) degree, but has less than a year's
clinical (practical) experience in any medical or surgical field. Furthermore, he has
not yet completed the final phase of the National Board of Medical Examiner's test,
which ultimately provides him with a license to practice general medicine. A "resi-
dent" begins training in a specific medical or surgical field after one year's internship.
A "first-year resident" has no more than one-year's experience in general medicine or
surgery, and no clinical experience in the specialized field in which he has chosen to
train. A "second-year resident" has a year's experience as an intern and a year's
experience in the field in which he is specializing. A fully-trained neurosurgeon
spends four years in medical school; a year's time in an internship in general surgery,
or a combination of medicine and surgery; a four- to seven-year residency in neuro-
logical surgery; and, if he desires further training, then a one- to two-year fellowship
in a subspecialty, such as pediatric neurosurgery. See American Medical Association:
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, Essentials and Information
Items 58-62 (Graduate Medical Education Directory, 1993); see also JulianT. Hoff,
Neurosurgical Education, in Philosophy of Neurological Surgery 137 (Issam A. Awad
ed., 1995).
150. Regulations implementing the Social Security Amendments of 1972, which
have remained suspended, would have denied fee-for-service payment to physicians
who supervised the care of poor patients, or who worked in hospitals that had tradi-
tionally provided a large volume of care for which the individual patient was unable
to pay. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 538.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
care since there is no single practitioner consistently available with
whom the patient can develop a long-term patient-physician rela-
tionship. Interns and residents serve patients in clinic settings for
only a few years until they complete their training and obtain jobs
elsewhere. Other critical issues, such as familiarity with the socio-
economic dynamics that affect health,' 51or an understanding of cul-
tural differences and potential language barriers which affect
communication between patient and doctor, 52 may be completely
neglected.
These larger teaching institutions may be at significant distances
from patients' homes. This scenario forces patients to travel to
those distant facilities, thereby wasting valuable time traveling
when they could receive urgent care sooner from a facility that is
more conveniently located. 53 Decreases in convenient health ser-
vices can lead to fewer visits to physicians, often condemning pa-
tients to access tertiary health care centers when they are sicker.
This trend usually results in higher health care costs. 1 54
MCO practices may result in the elimination of skilled physicians
interested in providing health care to underprivileged communi-
ties. Those physicians-including surgeons-who serve large num-
bers of poor, chronically ill or disabled children requiring frequent
medical vigilance, 55 protracted therapy and intense, costly provi-
sion of subspecialty health services, are least attractive to managed
care groups because of the very population for which they care.
The work of such experienced doctors may be greatly underval-
151. Inferior education and poverty are two such factors. See ROSENBLATr, supra
note 4, at 592.
152. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1635; see also Trubek, supra
note 9, at 1092.
153. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1635 n.52.
154. See Randall, supra note 11, at 209; see also Impact of Managed Care, supra
note 73, at 1636. A child with a minor ear infection that goes untreated with simple
medications that can be taken by mouth may develop a serious ear infection requiring
intravenous antibiotics and hospitalization. A pediatric neurosurgical example of this
problem would be the shunted hydrocephalic patient, whose symptoms of shunt
equipment malfunction may be inadvertently ignored for too long, and who may
come in to the hospital emergency room, already critically ill and requiring intensive
care unit management and supplementary surgical procedures that may have been
obviated by more timely consultation for the problem.
155. "Frequent medical vigilance" refers to continuity of care. In Wheeler v. Dy-
namic Engineering, Inc., the court noted that if an insurance policy insures against
illness, coverage for all medical costs arising from a particular illness vests when the
illness occurs, arguing in favor of reimbursement for the medical expenses associated
with continuity of care. 62 F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 1995).
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ued,156 making these physicians most vulnerable to the cost-con-
tainment measures of the managed care insurance companies.
Those physicians who care for the medically poor, who are ex-
cluded from managed care, or who are subject to continually de-
creasing reimbursement rates, may be forced to supplement their
income in other ways or may be driven out of the medical profes-
sion entirely. 157 Health care providers struggling with such finan-
cial constraints may find themselves unable to provide
uncompensated health care.
As a result, the quality of health care delivery to the medically
poor population, though financially covered by some health care
benefits, may not be as stringently supervised as is "privately ' '158
insured care delivered directly to the patient by a fully-trained sub-
specialist who has contracted independently with a managed care
plan.1 59 Skilled, experienced doctors, efficient in caring for high-
risk, ill patients, who are interested in serving poor and ill commu-
nities, may be overlooked by MCOs seeking doctors who serve a
higher percentage of healthy patients. 6 ° The pool of available
qualified physicians would continue to decrease, resulting in not
one, but two, casualties: the physician interested in serving the
156. Since a cost-efficient HMO would not want high-cost patients in its plan, the
doctors providing such care are not attractive to the plan because of the expenses they
incur to care for that particular group of patients. Because the patients are also
sicker, the physicians may have more valuable experience caring for the very ill, which
the HMO may ignore when it selects those physicians it puts on its provider panels or
rosters. However, it may be illegal to exclude them. Medicare prohibits cherry-pick-
ing elderly patients with few or no medical problems for enrollment in its health care
plans. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1629-30.
157. See Lindy Washburn, The Money Squeeze: Specialists Hit Hardest by HMOs,
THE RECORD, July 14, 1998, at A-1. Because of reduced fees and delays in reimburse-
ments to specialists, many are finding themselves supplementing their incomes in
other ways. Some physicians are peddling Amway products, setting up side busi-
nesses, earning law degrees, acquiring professorships, testifying in court as expert wit-
nesses, drawing on their pensions or dipping into savings to keep their practices
afloat. See id.
158. When privately insured patients receive health care, their insurance company
or MCO pays the physician directly, usually on a fee-for-service basis, rather than the
physician receiving a straight salary from an institution to provide health care for any
individual consulting that medical department, with the HMO or insurance plan pay-
ing the institution directly.
159. MCO certification requirements permit only fully trained, licensed physicians
to participate on their medical provider panels, suggesting that interns and residents
do not satisfy their criteria for quality health care providers.
160. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1634. A biased selection pro-
cess, such as this one, results in less qualified physicians available in the managed care
provider pool.
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poor and the Medicaid recipient or the uninsured patient.'
Chronically disabled patients, especially children, 162 who already
have difficulty obtaining health care from pre-paid health plans,
may suffer further. Without some change in the current health
care system, this practice could lead to poorer 163 health care for
destitute families and more burdensome health care costs in the
long run.164
IV. PROPOSALS
The challenge in health care today is to create affordable deliv-
ery systems for poor, medically fragile groups. In view of the crisis
in American health care costs, managed care cannot be ignored to
the detriment of overall health care in the long run. However, it
may be difficult to rebut an HMO's allegation that qualified physi-
cians providing costly subspecialty care for the chronically disabled
are selected out of their rosters utilizing criteria that are consistent
with business necessities. 65
Decreasing reimbursements and unrealistic fee schedules place
an unfair burden on subspecialty medical providers, saddling them
with the primary responsibility of subsidizing what essentially is
charity health care to the medically disenfranchised. Medicaid's
reduced reimbursements need to be integrated into key practice
161. See id. at 1629 n.19.
162. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 1094. Children's health care advocates emphasize
preventive care, asserting that dollars spent on prevention recoup their value many
times over in terms of dollars not spent on treatment by preventing disease. Prevent-
ative health care does not help the child born with a congenital abnormality or disa-
bility, which requires chronic subspecialized care. This aspect of the children's health
movement continues to discriminate against the chronically disabled child.
163. Lack of health insurance limits access to quality, timely, cost-effective health
care since the uninsured use fewer primary care visits than insured individuals, but
remain hospitalized longer than their insured counterparts, reflecting a more ad-
vanced stage of illness on admission. Lack of coverage results in limited access and
deferred care, which in turn leads to increased severity of illness and higher costs
when services are used. The uninsured and underinsured experience burdens of eco-
nomic hardship, ill health and mortality. See BCNYS, supra note 10.
164. The cost of uncompensated care (care for which no payment or government
subsidy is received) is borne by all payers in the health care delivery system. Health
reformers interested only in cost containment are failing to take a "systematic bird's-
eye view of society as a whole," to the detriment of health care in the United States.
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspective: Spending More through "Cost Control:" Our Obses-
sive Quest to Gut the Hospital, HEALTH AFi., Summer 1996, at 145, 146-47, quoted in
Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 752. Since Medicaid relies substantially on state funds,
states must raise revenues through income, sales and property taxes, which impact
more disproportionately on middle- and low-income families. See ROSENBLATr,
supra note 4, at 417-18.
165. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1638-39.
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management data in order to assess a practice's readiness for man-
aged care and its capacity to participate in Medicaid programs.
Among the expense categories that need to be included are costs
for delivering services to the different payers or managed care
plans, including salaries and benefits for the physician's office staff,
cost of equipment, office rent and insurance, malpractice and other
miscellaneous direct and indirect costs. 1 66 A more equitable distri-
bution of costs imposed on physicians by managed care can still
protect the patient's health care concerns and abide by the require-
ments of the managed care paradigm.
The acute care of chronically ill, disabled children requires a dif-
ferent standard of care, one that is not met by standards imposed
by the present managed care model. Whereas the managed care
payer model emphasizing preventive care through capitated pro-
grams and withhold systems may be appropriate for healthy popu-
lations, this paradigm is ineffective for the surgical patient
requiring acute care.
The type of surgical health care provider required by the chroni-
cally ill, disabled child cannot be reimbursed under the same sys-
tem as a primary care provider, such as a pediatrician or family
practitioner. Physicians' services are not fungible. There are quali-
tative differences between medical fields, based largely upon dif-
ferences in the complexity of services rendered, the time required
to provide them and the costs incurred by the physician in doing
so. 167 Federal and state financial incentives, such as tax exemptions
or improved physician reimbursements, may encourage more spe-
166. As an independent contractor who contracts with the HMO to provide health
care services, the physician pays for his own business expenses. If his business ex-
penses exceed the payments he receives from HMOs, his costs exceed his income and
he cannot afford to stay in practice.
167. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., plaintiffs argued that Blue Shield's
pricing structure banning balance billing eliminated competition among participating
physicians. The First Circuit's response was that the choice of what to buy and what
to offer to pay was the buyer's. It left the issue of qualitative differences among phy-
sicians to be determined by the buyer (in this case, Blue Shield) or by a regulator, but
not by the court. It never addressed the qualitative differences between medical
fields. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985). In Ambroze v.
Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., Inc., the court held that these "qualitative differences"
meant that one doctor was more skillful or experienced than another, or that one
physician was more aggressive with an HMO for needed care than another. It deter-
mined that offering better service and better quality care were the elements critical to
competition, and therefore, to physician reimbursement amounts. However, this
analysis is logical only when physicians within the same medical field are competing
with each other. No analysis of the complexity of different services, such as those of
surgical subspecialties, as opposed to less complex medical services, such as pediatrics,
was made. No. 95 CIV. 6631 (DLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
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cialty providers to enter into contracts with plans covering disabled
or underserved populations, as money is the motivating factor in a
competition-based approach. 168
Reimbursement for subspecialty services should continue along
the lines of fee-for-service. Fee schedules to specialty providers
serving disabled, chronically ill patients can be adjusted to account
for many different variables including: the child's diagnosis; the
time, intensity and complexity of the service provided; 169 the pro-
vider's specialty experience; the continuity of the care;170 and the
setting in which the care is given. Reimbursements should be in-
creased for time-consuming, complex subspecialty surgical care.
Basic or primary medical services requiring shorter periods of time
and less complex levels of care should be reimbursed at lower
rates. By balancing these two factors, the overall budget allocated
to health care will not be compromised.
Assistance with malpractice costs is another consideration. Mal-
practice insurers should be induced to decrease the fees they
charge the physicians they insure, based upon a case-by-case evalu-
ation of the number of malpractice suits brought against each par-
ticular physician. Defense costs for the physician with multiple
lawsuits brought against him may be considerable. However, the
physician with few suits brought against him incurs minimal, if any,
cost for the malpractice company. The insurer should pass those
1996), vacated and remanded to permit repleading, No. 96-7778, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1048 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1997).
In United States v. Mercy Health Servs., the court analyzed the geographic markets
for which two hospitals competed and viewed those two hospitals as entities providing
similar services. The court concluded that price consciousness plays a dominant role
in the care-seeking patterns of patients. Because the general services provided by the
hospitals were similar, they were deemed fungible for the purposes of the court's deci-
sion. This case also was not about the differences between medical fields, such as
surgical subspecialties as compared to pediatrics, where disparities in complexity of
services should play a role in physician reimbursements. The differences in complex-
ity between medical services provided apparently has not been a consideration when
Medicaid determines its physician reimbursements for specialized care. 902 F. Supp.
968, (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
168. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 1099, 1105.
169. An example of differing complexities may be a visit to the pediatrician for
immunizations or throat cultures, as opposed to a neurosurgical operation.
170. In Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc., the value of continuity of care for a
particular diagnosis was reconfirmed. The court held that a health care plan was re-
quired to cover a medical service (cancer treatment) despite the fact that it consisted
of a multiple-stage medical procedure (intermittent intravenous chemotherapy in ad-
dition to peripheral stem cell rescue) extending over a long period of time. 62 F.3d
634 (4th Cir. 1995).
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savings on to the physician consumer paying for the malpractice
policy, instead of pocketing the savings as profit.
HMOs should be required to contribute to the purchase of sub-
specialty malpractice coverage as required for physicians by the
terms of the HMO's contract. 171 Cost-sharing systems should be
integrated into HMO reimbursements to subspecialty providers
through government legislation regulating the managed care indus-
try. The paradigm to be used is the payment reform legislation
creating the Medicare Fee Schedule. This schedule specifies a rela-
tive value scale ("RVS") that indicates the value of each service
relative to other services, including a separate component for the
costs of malpractice coverage. 2 The idea is to permit a method of
allocating malpractice costs that differs from that for other practice
costs. Since malpractice premiums are determined primarily on
the basis of a physician's specialty, then a separate component for
malpractice allows the calculation of this expense according to a
physician's specialty in a RVS that does not incorporate other spe-
cialty differentials.' 73
HMOs must share the burden of providing health care to the
uninsured in a manner that reastically reflects the distribution of
delivery costs. Insured patients can pay a specified amount of
money into a state fund (in the form of a tax) which can then be
distributed by the government to special needs providers on the
basis of the charity care they provide. 174 Alternatively, insured pa-
tients could pay for premiums on a sliding-scale basis. Those pa-
tients who use services disproportionately more than others would
bear more of a financial burden than those who need significantly
less health care. 75 Medicaid itself requires that state agencies
make additional payments to hospitals serving a disproportionate
171. HMO contracts provide health care services to subscribers and may not be
immune from antitrust scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (2000). In Group Life & Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., a drugstore chal-
lenged an arrangement in which Blue Shield entered into contracts with participating
pharmacies who agreed to provide drugs to Blue Shield subscribers for a fixed price
paid by Blue Shield. The Supreme Court held that the primary elements of an insur-
ance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk. The phar-
macy agreements in question were considered arrangements for the purchase of
services by Blue Shield. As such, they did not involve underwriting or spreading of
risk, and were not immune from antitrust scrutiny. Exemption was for "the business
of insurance," and not "the business of insurers." 440 U.S. 205, 211, 213 (1979).
172. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 403.
173. See id.
174. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 4, at 509.
175. See Schlesinger, supra note 139, at 68.
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number of low-income patients. 176 Similarly, state agencies should
consider additional payments to those providers caring for this un-
derserved population, allocating funds according to complexity of
services provided, diagnosis and provider experience.
Congress or state legislatures can pass legislation mandating that
federal or state funds be directed to cover more adequately the
physician's costs in providing health care to the country's medically
indigent. Furthermore, legislation can prevent discriminatory
HMO practices that exclude chronically disabled, poor patients
from affordable access to quality health care and that devalue the
physicians who serve them. Medicaid managed care contracts are
worth billions of dollars. 177 Therefore, HMOs that recruit patients
from Medicaid pools can be required to hire or add to their ex-
isting networks a certain percentage of physicians who serve poor,
chronically disabled populations. These providers should be reim-
bursed at fair rates based upon physician input.178
A more extreme alternative is a publicly funded, single-payer,
government-directed system, such as the National Health Service
("NHS") in the United Kingdom. The NHS has a centrally fixed,
tightly controlled budget. Estimates of NHS funding sources find
that these consist of taxes (80%), insurance contributions (15%)
and patient charges (5%).179 The NHS purchases health care
through sectional District Health Authorities throughout the coun-
try. These Authorities are responsible for purchasing services for
their populations from hospitals, both for-profit and non-profit, as
well as from physicians. All patients have equal access to govern-
ment-subsidized health care. All general practitioners, who act as
gatekeepers for specialty and hospital care, as well as all specialists,
are employed by the NHS. Malpractice costs (and awards) are
kept to a minimum, compared to malpractice awards in the United
States. 180
If the institution of universal health care is truly a concern of the
American public (and of the legal profession, which presumes to
serve the needs of its clients), then a government-imposed limita-
tion on malpractice awards is a viable solution. This cap would
allow for decreased fees for malpractice coverage. The federal
government's increasing intrusion into health care delivery already
176. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 510.
177. See Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 768.
178. See Impact of Managed Care, supra note 73, at 1641.
179. See FURROW, HEALTH LAW, supra note 14, at 747.
180. See FURROW, FINANCE, supra note 20, at 749.
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comes on the heels of almost one hundred years of experience so
that further government action would not be untoward. 181
CONCLUSION
The reorganization of health care financing and health care de-
livery today has jeopardized the quality of subspecialty surgical
care for the medically needy, especially for the neurologically im-
paired child. Managed care has evolved into a two-tier system,
which has barred chronically disabled children from accessing
mainstream medical care. The concerns of these medically disen-
franchised consumers can be integrated into the health care system
however, partly by offering financial incentives to mainstream
providers to care for these patients, especially since money is an
effective stimulant for the competitive provision of health care. 182
Ignoring the health care needs of poor, neurologically impaired,
disabled children leaves them in an appalling predicament. This
situation will lead to disastrous consequences for the child's health
status and for the managed care system as a whole. There will be
increased demands on the health care system to provide more
medical services as medical technology advances, patient survival
and longevity increases, and more serious medical problems arise.
If something is not done, insurance plans will continue to limit the
medical coverage they will provide for disabled children by impos-
ing restrictions that they determine are appropriate despite physi-
cian recommendations to the contrary. Without competent,
accessible health care for poor, neurologically impaired children,
this population will be forced to suffer not only because of their
disabilities, but also because of insufficient government funding
and society's apathy toward their problems.
181. Government involvement in health care began with government reporting re-
quirements to prevent the spread of disease, and continued more recently with the
Newborns' and Mothers' Protection Act passed by Congress in response to some
HMOs' requiring mothers to leave the hospital with their newborn just one day after
childbirth. See Snoe, supra note 39, at 22, 77.
182. See Trubek, supra note 9, at 1105.
1982 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
TABLE 1
THE MOST FREQUENT PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGICAL
PROCEDURES AND THEIR CPT CODES183
CPT Code Procedures and services
99245 Office consultation for a new or established patient, which requires a
comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and a medical decision
making of high complexity.
99285 Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient,
which requires a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and
medical decision making of high complexity.
62223 Creation of shunt; ventriculo-peritoneal, -pleural, other terminus.
62230 Replacement or revision of CSF shunt, obstructed valve, or distal catheter in
shunt system.
61510 Craniectomy, trephination, bone flap craniotomy; for excision of brain tumor,
supratentorial, except meningioma.
61518 Craniectomy for excision of brain tumor, infratentorial or posterior fossa; except
meningioma, cerebellopontine angle tumor, or midline tumor at base of skull.
61343 Craniectomy, suboccipital with cervical laminectomy for decompression of
medulla and spinal cord, with or without dural graft (e.g., Arnold-Chiari
malformation).
61552 Craniectomy for craniosynostosis; multiple cranial sutures.
63200 Laminectomy, with release of tethered spinal cord, lumbar.
62005 Elevation of depressed skull fracture; compound or comminuted, extradural.
183. See CPT, supra note 109.
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TABLE 2
COMPARATIVE REIMBURSEMENT FOR NEUROSURGERY
NNY
Aetna -
CPT Sample Fees, US Ind.
Code 1994 Healthcare Empire Health Oxford PHS1 8 5  Medicaid
99245 $225.00 $105.00 $203.00 $250.00 $210.00 $244.00 $36.00186
99285 $250.00 $105.00 $137.00 $188.52 $194.00 $36.00187
62223 $5,500.00 $1,672.00 $1,285.03 $1,938.00 $1,079.00 $360.00
62230 $4,500.00 $1,062.00 $1,049.00 $1,285.03 $1,938.00 $1,079.00 $360.00
61510 $10,000.00 $2,600.00 $3,348.24 $4,602.75 $2,937.00 $500.00
61518 $10,500.00 $3219.00 $4,055.42 $4,825.01 $3,510.00 $600.00
61343 $9,500.00 $3,406.00 $3,806.57 $5,652.50 $3,172.00 BR188
61552 $8,500.00 $2,106.22 $1,733.00 $400.00
63200 $9,500.00 $2,454.31 $2,561.00 $400.00
62005 $7,500.00 $2,761.11 $1,649.19 $340.00
184. "Ind. Health" denotes Independent Health Association.
185. "PHS" denotes Physician Health Services.
186. This represents the reimbursement rate for "preferred pediatric providers."
The reimbursement rate for the same service provided by a physician without that
designation is $7.00.
187. There are slightly higher reimbursement rates for "preferred pediatric
providers."
188. "BR" denotes "by report." Medicaid requires that the medical report for the
procedure be submitted, at which time it is reviewed and the reimbursement decided
at the time of that review, without the medical provider's participation.
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